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PREFACE 
Among recent trends in Thomistic studies a growing interest 
in St. Thomas' Platonic and neo-Platonic characteristics is evi-
dent. Arthur Little's The Platonic Heritage of Thomisml is a good 
example of just such a study. The principal doctrine attributed 
to St. Thomas' Platonic bent is that of participation. In recent 
years ·two second editions of notable works on st. Thomas' theory 
of participation have appeared. First, there is L.-B Geiger's 
La Participation dans la Philosophie de S. Thomas d'Aquin2 and 
then there is Cornelio Fabro's La Nozione Metafisica d~ Partecipa-
zione secondo S. Tommaso d'Aquino. 3 
The study of this doctrine of participation in the works of 
St. Thomas leads to the posing of several questions, chief among 
which might be couched in these terms: was St. Thomas of Aquinas 
a Platonic Aristotelian or an Aristotelian Platonist? Or in other 
words: was St. Thomas fundamentally an Aristotelian or a Plato-
nist? Those who would answer with the latter make much of St. 
Thomas' doctrine of participation. 
To attempt an answer to this question within the scope of a 
Master's thesis would be extremely presumptuous. A definitive 
lDublin, 1949. 
2Second edition, Paris, 1953. 
3Second edition. Rome, 1950. 
~ 
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answer could be given only after years of careful study and re-
search, and p~rhaps not even then. 
The author of this thesis would like to investigate one sec-
tion of this larger problem and has endeavored to present St. Thom 
as' doctrine on the participation of creatures in good. This is 
certainly a limited subject, but it is felt that an exposition in 
English of St. Thomas' theory of how creatures participate in good 
will contribute something toward the study of st. Thomas' doctrine 
of participation in general and maybe ~ accidens throw a little 
light on the historical side of the question. For participation 
in good is one of the principal types of participation and one of 
the more Platonic aspects of the doctrine itself. 
There have been several studies of St. Thomas' doctrine on 
good. A rather well worked-out treatment of the Thomistic philos-
ophyof the metaphysical good is contained in Sister Enid's dis-
sertation for the Catholic University of America, The Goodness of 
Being in Thomistic Philosophy and Its Contemporary Significance. 4 
Another treatment of St. Thomas' philosophy of the good is Eliza-
beth G. Salmon's The Good in Existential Metaphysics. 5 Since it 
is the Aquinas Lecture for 1952 at Marquette University, this work 
has the limitation of being restricted to a paper of an hour's 
reading. 
Neither the current studies of St. Thomas' metaphysics of the 
4Sister Enid Smith, O.S.B., Washington, D.C., 1947. 
5 
aukee 1953. 
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good nor the works on participation go into the subject of partic-
ipation in g?od to any length or detail. A wedding of the two 
doctrines--an exposition of the Thomistic doctrine of participatio 
in good--is the aim of this thesis. 
This study is not historical but expository. It does not at-
tempt to state what the heritage of St. Thomas was nor to place 
him in one philosophical camp or another on the basis of doctrinal 
leanings. This thesis merely ambitions the presentation of St. 
Thomas' doctrine of p~rticipation in good, of what Thomas said on 
the subject and not what his sayings on the subject make of him. 
This study suffers a notable omission which could be treated 
quite legitimately within the confines of the subject matter, that 
is, the epistemological side of the question. Most of the aspects 
of the question pertaining to the theory of knowledge have been o-
mitted entirely; a few have been touched upon cursorily. Both 
the omission and the terse treatment of these important aspects of 
the problem are due to the necessary limitations of a paper of 
this scope. 
The procedure call~ for by this thesis entails working from 
those texts of the works of St. Thomas that deal directly with the 
subject. On the question of the good this is Question 21 of the 
Quaestiones Disputatae d~ Veritate, the Question de Bono. This 
section of the De Veritate forms the basis for the treatment of 
the metaphysics of the good because it is the longest and most de-
veloped treatise of St. Thomas on the subject. Furthermore, the 
V ritate ranks with the Summa Theolo iae and 
. v 
/ 
ix 
Gentiles as one of the major works of St. Thomas. As Etienne Gil-
son puts it, "the Quaestiones de Veritate • • • are no less indis-
pensable to know than the two Summas for the person who would pen-
etrate to the very depths of St. Thomas' thought.,,6 Vernon Bourke 
states, moreover, that "most of the basic principles and conclu-
sions of Thomistic wisdom are thoroughly developed in this earli-
est and longest group of disputed questions.,,7 
It should be noted here that the treatment of St. Thomas' doc-
trine on the good is limited to the metaphysical good and bypasses 
or merely touches upon the Thomistic teaching on the moral and 
psychological goods • 
The principal text to be consulted in the matter of partici-
pation is from the second chapter or lesson of the In Librum Boe-
tii De Hebdomadibus Expositio. Unlike the question of the good, 
the subject of partiCipation is not treated at length in the works 
of St. Thomas. Consequently, the text from the De .Hebdomadibus 
forms the basis of the study, while other texts from the works of 
St. Thomas will be consulted to interpret, extend, and amplify 
what is said in the Commentary ££ Boethius' De Hebdomadibus. 
Throughout the entire study no text promising to be helpful will 
be neglected. 
The metaphysics of the good will be treated first, and then 
6Etienne Gilson, La Philosophie Au Moyen Age (Paris, 1947), 
pp. 527-28. 
7Vernon J. Bourke, "Introduction" to Truth (Chicago, 1952), 
I. xxvi. 
/ 
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St. Thomas' doctrine on participation in general. Lastly, the 
doctrine of the participation of creatures in good will be consid-
ered. This arrangement has been selected because it is felt that 
the notions of partiCipation and of good must be clarified before 
the doctrine of participation in good can be expounded. 
To a large extent, quotations from the works of St. Thomas 
that occur in the body of the text of this study are given in Eng-
lish with the original Latin in the footnote. For the most part, 
standarq translations have been used: for the Quaestiones Dispu-
tatae de Veritate, Truth~ for the Summa Contra Gentiles, the Domi-
nican Translationj9 for most of the Summa Theologiae cited in this 
study, Basic Writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas; 10 where that was not 
possible, the Dominican Translationll of that work was used. Where 
other translations have been employed, they will be cited in the 
proper places. Where a translation is given and no translator is 
mentioned, the translation is that of the author of this thesis. 
8Translated from the definitive Leonine text by Robert W. 
Mulligan, S.J.j James V. McGlyrul, S.J.j and Robert W. Schmidt, S.J. 
(Chicago, 1952-1954). 
9Translated by the English Dominican Fathers, 5 vols. (Lon-
don, 1924-1929). 
lOTranslated into Englishj edited and annotated, with an in-
troduction, by Anton C. Pegis, 2 vols. (New York, 1945). 
llTranslated by. the English Dominican F'athers. It'irst Americar: 
edition, 3 vols. (New York, 1947-1948). When a citation from this 
Iwork is ai ven it wi 11 be oreceded bv the initials D. T. 
/ 
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THE DOCTRINE OF SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS 
ON THE METAPHYSICAL GOOD 
In order to understand St. Thomas' theory on participation in 
good, it will be necessary first to understand precisely what is 
contained in the notion of good, in which creatures participate. 
In the twenty-first question of the Quaestiones Disputatae ~ 
Veritate, the Quaestio de ~, there are three topics of special 
importance and interest: (1) the relation of the notion of good 
to that of being, (2) the order of the transcendentals, and (3) the 
question of participation in good. All six of the articles of this 
question fall under one or other of these topics. l Since the last 
topic of these three, that of participation, will be treated in the 
final chapter of this study, after the general ideas on participa-
tion have been examined, this chapter will be concerned with the 
relation between good and being and the order of the transcenden-
tals. 
As for the first of the two topics to be considered 1n this 
chapter, that of the relation of good to being, St. Thomas and 
lThe sixth article introduces an Augustinian question not 
directly on the point of this study; hence it will not be treated 
here. The question is: Does the Good of a Creature Consist in 
Measure, Species, and Order as Augustine Says? 
all philosophers are faced with a problem. When a man says that 
something 1s good, it would seem that he is adding something to 
that thing; an addition to being, however, seems impossible be-
cause the universal concept of being contains all things within 
it. "For every reality is essentially a being."2 
St. Thomas starts his close metaphysical analysis of tbe re-
lationship obtaining between being and good by an enumeration of 
the ways in wh1ch one th1ng can be added to another: "Someth1ng 
can be added to sometb1ng else in three ways. (1) It adds some 
reality wbich is outside the essence of the thing to which it is 
said to be added. For instance, white adds something to body, 
since the essence of whiteness is something beyond that of body."3 
Of the three, modes of addit10n, the first is rea11zed when one 
th1ng is added to another; and the addendum is outs1de the essence 
of that to which it is added. This kind of addition takes place 
when white is added to man, for it is not of the essence of man 
that he be white. 
Another mode of addition is had by contraction or determina-
2De Veritate, 1, 1 c: "Q,uaelibet natura essentialiter est 
ens" ~anctl Thomae Aquinatis Q,uaestiones Disputatae, vol. It 
De Veri tate, ed. Raymundus Splazzl, O.p. [Rome, 1949J, p. 2 b}. 
The translation is from Truth, vol. I, trans. Robert W. Mulli-
gan, S.J. (Chicago, 1952), p. 5. 
3~ Ver., 21, 1 c: "Tripliciter potest aliqu1d super alterum 
addere. Uno modo quod addat aliquam rem quae sit extra essentiam 
illius rer-cur-Qrcitur addi; sicut album addit super corpus, quia 
assentia albed1n1s est praeter essentiam corporis." The trans-
lation is from Truth, vol. III, trans. Robert W. Schmidt, S.J. 
(Ch1cago, 1954), p. 5. 
:3 
tion. This happens when the notion of man is added to animal. 
Previous to. the addition of man, animal contains the notion of 
man implicitly or potentially. Man contracts and determines the 
notion of animal, giving it the formal qualities of a man. 
Alio modo dicitur aliquid addi super alterum per 
modum contrahendi et determinandij sicut homo addit ali-
quid super animal: non quldem ita quod sit in homine 
allqua res quae sit penltus extra essentiam animalis, 
alias oporteret dicere, quod non totum quod est homo 
esset animal, sed animal esset pars hominisj sed animal 
per hominem contrahltur, quia id quod determinate et 
actuallter continetur in ratione hOminis, impllclte et 
quasi potentiallter continetur in ratione anlmalis. 8i-
cut est de ratione hominis quod habeat animam rationa-
lem, et de ratione animalis est quod habeat animam, non 
determinando ad rationalem vel non rationalemj ista ta-
men determinatio ratione cuius homo super animal addere 
dicitur, in aliqua re fundatur. 4 
It should be noted that in this type of addition there is a real 
foundation for the determination or contraction. Although the 
genus animal is capable of being rational or irrational, in the 
actual composit~ there is an existing reality that makes it the 
one and not the othero 
The third and last type of addition is made in thought alone. 
What is added by the second notion is only a conceptual note which 
is not found in the notion of the first. For example, the adjec-
tive blind adds something to the notion of man, namely, blindness; 
but blindness is only a conceptual being and not a natural one, 
because it is a privation. Nonetheless, blindness contracts the 
notion of man because not every man is blind. When we speak of a 
/ 
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blind mole, however, we do not determine our notion of mole in any 
way, because. every mole is blind. 
Tertio modo dicitur aliquid addere super alterum 
secundum rationem tantum; ~ando scilicet aliquid est 
de ratione unius quod non est de ratione alterius: quod 
tamen nihil est in rerUIn natura, sed in ratione tantum, 
sive per illud contrahatur id cui dicitur addi, sive 
non. Caecum enim addit aliquid supra hominem, scilicet 
caecitatem, quae non est aliquod ens in natura, sed ra-
tionis tantum, secundum quod ens est comprehendens pri-
vationes; et per hoc homo contrahitur, non enim omnis 
homo caecus est; sed cum dicitur talpam caecam, non fit 
per hoc additum aliqua contractio. 5 
It does not make any difference, then, whether the conceptual ad-
dition contracts or determines the being to which it is added. 
What characterizes this third type of addition is that it is made 
by thought alone. 
After describing these three types of addition, St. Thomas 
proceeds to see what kind is employed when the note of goodness 
is added to being. It is clear that good is not added to being 
in the first way. In fact, nothing can be added to the universal 
concept of being according to the first manner of addition; for 
this type of addition requires that the addendum be outside the 
essence of that to which it is added, and there is nothing that 
exists or has any reference to existence outside the essence of 
transcendental being. nIt is not possible • • • for something to 
add anything to being in general in the first· way, though in that 
way there can be an addition to some particular sort of being; for 
· ~ 
/ 
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there is no real being which is outside the essence of being in 
general, though some reality may be outside the essence of ~ 
being. ".6 As Thomas points out, something can be outside the com-
prehension of this or that particular being; but nothing can be 
outside the all-embracing concept of being taken in the transcen-
dental sense. 7 
As for the second kind of addition, that of contraction and 
determination, there are many things which can be added to the 
transcendental concept of being according to it. All of the ten 
categories are added in this way; for each of the ten categories 
or predicaments adds a determined mode of existence to the notion 
of being: substance adds the mode of being in itself; accident, 
that of being in another; relation, that of being referred to an-
other; and so forth. Good, however, cannot be added in this way: 
Secundo autem modo inveniuntur ali qua addere super 
ens, quIa ens contrahltur per decem genera, quorum unum-
quodque addit aliquid super ens; non aliquod aCCidens, 
6Ibid.: "Non autem potest esse quod super ens universale 
aliqui~dat aliquid lrimo ~, quamvis illo modo posslt tIeri 
aliqua additio super a iquod ens particulare; nulla enim res na-
turae est quae sit extra essent1am entis universalis, quamvis 
aliqua rest sit extra essent1am :ibulus entis." It 1s clear that 
in this passage universalis as applied to being means transcen-
dental, a term commonly used by the later scholastics. Univer-
salis could not mean univocal here. 
7In 1, 1 c. of the same work, Aquinas says the same thing: 
"Sed enti non potest addi ali quid quasi extranea natura, per modum 
quo differentia additur generi, vel accidens subiecto, quia quae-
libet natura essentialiter est ens." Nothing can be added to be-
ing as though 'it were extraneous to_being, for every nature is 
essentially a being. 
vel aliquam differentiam quae sit extra essentiam entis, 
sed determinatum modum essendi, qui fundatur in ipsa es-
sentia rei. 
Sic autem bonum non addit aliquid super ens: cum 
bonum dividatur aequaliter in decem genera, ut patet in 
I Ethlcor.: et ideo oportet quod vel nihil addat super 
ens, vel ai addat, quod sit in ratione tantum. 8 
6 
As St. Thomas has already indicated, good is a mode that follows 
upon every being;9 and, as Aristotle says,lO the good is equally 
divided among the ten categories of being. Therefore, good can-
not be a determined mode of being. 
By this process of exclusion, it becomes evident that, it 
good adds anything to being, it must do so according to the third 
type of addition, which is by concept alone. Now good does add 
something to being because men do not call a thing good for no 
reason at all. Therefore, since every conceptual addition is ei-
ther a negation or a certain kind ot relation and good is not a 
negative but a positive notion, it must be that good adds some 
kind of a relation to being. 
Si enim adderetur aliquid reale, oporteret quod 
per rationem boni contraheretur ens ad aliquod speciale 
genus. Cum autem ens sit id quod primo cadit in concep-
aDe Var., 21, 1 c. In the same work, 1, 1 c, the relation 
of the-Categories to being is explained: "Sunt enim diversi gra-
dus entitatls, secundum quos accipiuntur diversi modi essendi, et 
iuxta hos modos accipiuntur divaraa rerum genera. Substantia enim 
non addit supra ens aliquam differentlam, quae slgnificat aliquam 
naturam superadditam enti, sed nomine substantiae exprim1tur qui-
dam specialis modus essendi, scilicet per se ens; et ita est in 
allis generibus." 
9~., 1, i c. 
l~icomachean Ethics., I, 5, 1096 a, 19-30. 
J 
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tione mentis •• '. , oportet quod omne illud nomen vel 
sit synonymum enti:. quod de bono diei non potest, eum 
non nugatorie dieatur ens bonumj vel addat aliquid ad 
minus seoundum l'ationemj et sio oportet quod bonum, ex 
quo non eontrahit ens, addat aliquid super ens, quod 
sit rationis tantum. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Sic ergo supra ens ••• unum addit id quod est ra-
tionis tantum, soilicet negationem: dioitur enim unum 
quasi ens indivisum. Sed verum et bonum positive dieun-
turj unde non possunt addere nisi relationem quae sit 
rationis tantumo ll ' 
7 
Of the three proper accidents or properties that are consequent on 
every being, one or oneness adds a negative note, that of indivis-
ibility. Since true and good are positive notions, they must add 
a relation which is of the reason alone. 
The nature of this merely rational or conceptual relation, 
which will be referred to as a ~-~ relation hereafter in this 
study, remains to be clarified. Something is related to another 
thing in a non-real sense, says Thomas quoting Aristotle, when it 
is not really dependent upon that to which it is related; but, on 
the contrary, that to which it is related is really dependent upon 
it.12: Such is the relation existing between knowledge and the 
thing known: 
Illa autem relatio • • • dicitur esse rationis tantum, 
secundum quam dicitur referri id quod non dependet ad 
id ad quod refertur, sed e converso, cum ipsa relat10 
quaedam dependentia sit, sicut patet in scientia et sci~ 
bili, sensu et sensibili. Scientia en1m dependet a sci-
bili, sed non e converso: unde relatio qua scientla re-
fertur ad sclbile, est realis; relatl0 vero qua sclbile 
llIbid. 
-
l2Metaphysics, r , 15, 1021 a, 27. 
· I 
;' 
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refertur ad sCientiam, est rationis tantum: dicitur e-
nim scibile referri • • • non quia ipsum referatur, sed 
quia aliud refertur ad ipsum. Et ita est in omnibus 
aliis "quae se habent ut mensura et mensuratum, vel per-
fectivum et perfectibile. 13 
8 
The thing known is related to knowledge in a non-real sense be-
cause in no way is the thing known actually dependent upon know-
ledge; but knowledge is really dependent upon the thing known, 
and from this point of view there is a real relation between the 
two. 
St. Thomas goes on to say that in this way the true and the 
good add the merely rational or conceptual note of ~ which ~­
fects to the notion of being. "The true and the good must there-
fore add to the concept of being, a relationship of that which 
perfects. 1t14 Elsewhere, speaking of the three major transcenden-
tals, one, true, and good, St. Thomas says, "But none of these 
adds any difference that limits being, but a quality that follows 
upon every being; just as the one adds the quality of indivisibil-
ity, and the good the quality of finality, and the true the quali-
ty of ordination to knowledge. M15 Here Aquinas is careful to pOint 
13De Ver., 21, 1 c. For the same doctrine see ~.T., I, 13, 
7 c; III; 35; 5, ad 3; In I Sent., 30, 1, 1, ad 2; De Yot., 7, 8, 
ad 1; 7, 11, ad 1. In S.!.,-r;-13, 7, ad 6 St. Thomas gives this 
norm for seeing whether the relations are mutually real or not: 
"Si enim unum in sui inte11ectu c1audat aliud et e oonverso, tunc 
sunt simu1 natura. • •• Si autem unum in sui intellectu c1audat 
aliud, et non e converso, tunc non sunt simul natura. Et hoc modo 
se habent scientia at scibi1e." 
l4De Var., 21, 1 c (III, 6): "Oportet 19ltur quod verum et 
bonum super-rnte1l~ctum entis addant respectum perfectlvl." 
-
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out that the three transcendentals do not determine being in any 
way but add, each of them, a formalityt indivisibility by the 
one, finality by the good, and ordination to cognition by the true~ 
Although both the true and the good add a note of ~ which 
~erfects to being according to their respective formalities, there 
is a distinction not only between the kind of perfection added but 
also in the mode in which each one adds to being. In every being 
there is a specific character and there is existence., According-
ly, one being can perfect another in two ways. 
In quolibet autem ente est duo considerare: scili-
cet ipsam rationem speciei, et esse ipsum quo aliquid 
allud subsls~lt In specIe ll1a;-er-sIc allquod ens po-
test esse perfectlvum dupliclter. 
Uno,modo secundum ratlonem speciel tantum •. Et sic 
ab ente perficitur intellectus, qui perflcltur per ra-
tlonem entis. Nec tamen ens est ln eo secundum esse na-
turale; et ldeo hunc modum perflclendl addlt verum super 
ens. Verum enim est ln mente • • • ; et unumquodque ens 
ln tantum dlcitur verum, in quantum conformatum est vel 
conformabile lntellectui. 16 
The flrst way, then, that one belng can perfect another ls ln the 
11ne of the spec1flc character of the perfectlng belng, as happens 
when the lntellect is perfected by an object outslde ltself. For, 
ln cognltlon, the belng known does not exlst ln the 1ntellect ac-
cording to lts natural existence; but its specles or speclfic 
character exists there intent10nally. 
quam d1fferentlam contrahentem ens, sed rat10nem quae consequltur 
omne ens; sicut unum add1t rat10nem lndlvlslonls, et bonum ratlone 
flnls, et verum ratlonem ordln1s adrf0gnltlonem·' (Scrlptum Super 
L1bros Sententlarum, ed. Mandonnet L!'arls, 1929], I, 488)., 
16!2!. Y.!!:., 21, 1 c. 
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The second mode of perfecting another is that which is accom-
plished in poth the specific character and the existence. It is 
in this way that the good perfects being. uA being is perfective 
of another not only according to its specific character but also 
according to the existence which it has in reality. In this fash-
ion the good is perfective; for the good is in things, as the 
Philosopher says."17 Thus the good perfects another being not 
only acoording to the specific character of good but alao accord-
ing to ita own existence; and, for this reason, the good is said 
to be present in things. 
It is noteworthy that St. Thomas refers to the addition the 
good makes to being as a ratio and not a natura. "Bonum, verum et 
unum addunt super ens, non quidem naturam aliquam, 'sed rationem."18 
Natura here is taken in the sense of an essence existing in real-
ity; ratio, as a formal aspect or formality of something also ex-
isting in reality. The point that Thomas wants to make is that 
the good does not add another entity to being; indeed, as Aquinas 
has already said,19 this would be impossible. What the concept of 
good does is to point to some aspect or facet of being that is not 
l7Ibid., (III, 7), HAlio modo ens est perfectivum alterius 
non solum-Becundum rationem speCIer, sed etiam secundum esse quod 
habet in rerum natura. Et per hunc modum est perfectivum bonum. 
Bonum enim in rebus est, ut Philo8ophus dicit in VI Metaphys." 
The exact place in The Metaphysics is E, 4, 1027 b, 25-26. 
18!a I ~., 8, 1, 3 c. 
19See De Ver., 1, 1 c and 21, 1 c; for a discussion of this 
same point seepp., 4 and 5 above. 
,,/ 
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understood specifically by the concept being taken in.itself. 
What, then, is the content of the concept good? St. Thomas 
answers that since the good thing completes and perfects another 
thing, it takes on an aspect of finality toward that which it per-
fects. "Inasmuch as one being by reason of its act of existing is 
suoh as to perfect and complete another, it stands to that other 
as an end. And hence it is that all who rightly define good put 
in its notion something about its status as an end. The Philoso-
pher accordingly says that they excellently defined good who said 
that it is 'that which all things desire.,lt20 The concept of good, 
then, inasmuch as it perfects and completes the being which tends 
toward it, is a final cause or end for that being. 
In this first article of the twenty-first question of the De 
Veri tate , St. Thomas distinguishes two types of good. The first 
type, holding the highest position on the scale of goods, is that 
which perfects another as an end. Another type of good, called 
useful by the Angelic Doctor, is that which leads to an end or na. 
20De Ver., 21, 1 c (III, 7): "In quantum autem unum ens est 
secundum-esse suum perfectivum alterius et conservativum, habet 
rationem finis respectu illius quod ab eo perficiturj et inde est 
quod omnes recte definientes bonum ponunt in ratione eius aliquid 
quod pertineat ad habitudinem finis; unde Philosophps dicit in I 
Ethicorum, quod bonum optime definiunt dicentes, quod bonum est 
quod omnia appetunt." As given in the text above, Truth, Which is 
a translation of the Leonine Manuscript, translates the phrase 
"In quantum autem unum ens est secundum esse suum perfectivum al-
terius et conservati'vum"' (emphasis added) by "Inasmuch as one be-
ing by reason of Its act of existing is such ~s to perfect and COm-
plete another," which would indicate that the Leonine Text readS-
something other than conservativum here, possibly completivum or, 
better, consummativum. In any case, it will be taken to mean 
complete in the. English sense. 
--
l~ 
turally follows upon an end; this type of being is called good in 
either a causal or significative sense. nFirst of all and princi-
pally • • • a being capable of perfecting another after the manner 
of an end is called good; but seQondari1y something is called good 
which leads to an end (as the useful is said to be good), or which 
naturally follows upon an end (as not only that which has health 
is called healthy, but also anything which causes, preserves, or 
signifies health) ._2.1 To these two categories of good, St. Thomas 
adds a third type, the pleasurable. 22.. He defines the pleasurable 
good as that which quiets or brings rest to a desire. 23 
What is the relation of these three types of good among them-
selves? St. Thomas tells us that the honorable good and the 
pleasurable good are goods in themselves inasmuch as they contain 
the aspect of true finality or end in itself and are not subordi-
nated to some other end as the useful good is. nThe useful good 
is ordained to the pleasurable and to the honorable as to an end; 
and thus there are two principal goods, the honorable, namely, and 
2..11bid.: "Sic ergo primo et principaliter dicitur ens bonum 
perfectlvum alterius per modum finis; sed secundario dicitur ali-
quid bonum, quod est ductivum in finem: prout utile dicitur bonum, 
vel natum est consequi finem." 
22See De Ver., 22, 15 Cj 24, 1, ad 11; and 24, 6 c for places 
where ThomaS-mentions all three types of good. 
231n the Summa Theologiae, I, 5, 6 c, St. Thomas defines the 
pleasurable good thus: wId autem quod terminat motum appetitus ut 
quies in re desiderata, est delectation; and in the same work, 
II-II, 145, 3 c, he says, ItDelectabile_autem dicitur inquantum 
quietat appetitum." This note of satisfaction of a desire seems 
to characterize the pleasurable good. 
-13 
the pleasurable. n24 The honorable good and the pleasurable seem 
to be good- in the proper sense, while the useful is called good as 
though by an analogy of attribution. 
A more precise alignment of the three goods places the pleas-
urable good beneath the honorable because the pleasurable good is 
not always in accord with reason and con8.equently is not always a 
moral good, whereas the honorable good and the useful good are al-
ways in accord with reason and therefore morally gOOd. 25 For this; 
reason the pleasurable good is subordinated to the honorable. 
"Goodness is not divided into these three as something univocal 
) which is predicated equa.lly of them all, but as something analogi ... 
cal which is predicated of them according to priority and posteri-
ority. For it i8 predicated ch1efly of the honorable, then of the 
pleasant, and lastly of the useful. n26 The good, then, is predi-
cated first of all of the honorable good, secondly of the pleas-
urable, and lastly of the useful. 
24De Malo I, 4~ ad 12; Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo, Mari-
etti ed:-(Rome: 1942}, II, 18. See De Ver., 24, ~ c;ror-tne same 
doctrine. 
25 S.T., I-II, 34, 2, ad 1; see also I, 5, 6, ad 2. 
2:6Ibid., I, 5, 6, ad 3: '''Bonum non d1vid1tur 1n ieta tria 
sicut unIVOcum aequaliter de his praedicatum; sed sicut analogum, 
quod praedicatur secundum prius et posterius. Per prius enim 
praedicatur de honesto; et secundario de delectabili; tertio de 
utili." (Saneti Thomae Aguinatis Summa Theolog1ae, with Leonine 
text, e. P. Caramello L1ur1n, 1950J, I, 2~ b.) The translation 
is from The Basic Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas (a revision at 
the English Dominican transIition), e. Anton c. Pegis (New York, 
1945), I, 50.., 
1:4 
In the second article of Question 21 of the De Veri tate St. 
Thomas takes up the question of whether good and being are inter-
changeable in their real subjects. 27 Aquinas' teaching on the 
good requires that good and being be identical in real, existing, 
concrete beings, or, as they are called, supposites. 
St. Thomas argues in the following way. Since the nature of 
good consists in the ability of one thing to perfect another thlng 
as. an end, everything that has the notion of end has the notion of 
good. 28 There are, moreover, two aspects of the notion of end; 
(1) it is desired by those things which do not as yet possess it; 
and (2) lt is relished and delighted in by those things which are 
already in possession of it. As Thomas puts it: -Two things are 
essentlal to an end: it must be sought or desired by things which 
have not yet attained the end, and it must be loved by the things 
which share the end, and be, as it were, enjoyable to them. For 
it is essentially the same to tend to an end and in some sense to 
repose in that end."29 With this point established, the next 
2,7De Vera 21, 2 c: "utrum ens et bonum convertantur secun-
dum supposlta.' 
2BSee S.T~, I, 19, 1, ad 1; 49, 1 c; I-II, 72, 1, ad 1; 94, 
2 c; II-II,-44, 1 c; where Thomas says that an end has the formal 
aspect of good. In De Ver., 21, 2 c he says, "Cum ratio boni in 
hoc consistat quod aIrquld sit perfectlvum alterius per modum 
finls, orone ld quod invenitur habere rationem finis, habet et ra-
tionem boni.1I 
2.9De Ve~., 21, 2 c (III, 10): -Duo ••• sunt de ratione fi-
nis; ut-ScIIicet sit appetitum vel desideratum ab his quae finem 
nondum attingunt, aut sit dilectum, et quasi delectabile, ab his 
quae finem participant: cum eiusdem rationis sit tendere in finem 
e+: "nfinA auadammonoouiescel"s." 
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question is: are these two formalities found in being? 
That these two aspects of goodness are verified in being is 
proved in the following way: (1) those things which do not have 
existence, tend to it as prime matter tends toward form; and (2) 
all things which have existence naturally love their existence and 
conserve it with all their strength. Therefore, all things are 
good, either by tending toward existence which they do not have 
or by enjoying the existence they already have. "For whatever 
does not yet participate in the aot of being tends toward it by a 
certain natural appetite. In this way matter tends to form, ac-
cording to the Philosopher. But everything which already has be-
ing naturally loves its being and with all its strength preserves 
it. tt30 
It is in the sense of the good's being applied to prime mat. 
ter that the good is said to have a larger extension than being. 
"Accordingly matter cannot be called a being absolutely, because 
it is a potential being, whereby it is shown to have an order to-
wards being: and yet this suffices for it to be called a good ab-
solutely, on account of this very order. This shows that the good 
1n a sense, extends further than being. n3l In the De Veritate, 
30Ib1d • (III, 11): "Quae enim nondum esse participant, in 
esse quodam naturali appetitu tenduntj unde et materia appetit for 
mam, secundum Philosophum in I. Phys. Omnia autem quae iam esse 
habent, illud esse suum naturaliter amant, et ipsum tota virtute 
conservant." The reference to The Physics of Aristotle is I, 9, 
192 a, 22. -
31 e.G., III, 20: "Materia ergo non potest simpliciter dici 
o 
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however, St. Thomas is careful to point out that good is extended 
to prime matter in a causal, and not in a real or predicative, 
senae. "Good extends to non-beings not attribut1vely but causally 
inasmuch'as non-beings tend to good. n32 The prime matter cannot 
be said to be good in a real sense because prime matter of itself 
really does not exist; but it can be said to be good in this that 
it tends toward good through the final causality of goodness. 
"For even non-existent things, namely matter considered as subject 
to privation, seek a good, namely to exist. Hence it follows that 
matter also is good; for nothing but the good seeks the good."33 
After stating that every existing being has one of the two 
features of an end, either it tends toward being or enjoys and 
conserves its own actual existence, and accordingly has the nature 
of good (inasmuch as every good perfects another being as an end},~' 
Aquinas concludes that every existence has the formality o~ good. 
potest autem ex hoc simpliciter dici bona, propter ordinem ipsum 
ad bonum. In quo apparet quod bonum quodammodo amplioris est 
ambitus quan ens" (Sancti Thomae de A2uino Summa Contra Gentiles, 
Leonine manual ed. LRome, 1~3{J, p:-24 b). The translation Is 
from The Summa Contra Gentiles of St. Thomas Aquinas, trans. Eng-
lish Dominican Fathers (London,-r928), III, Part I, 40. 
32De Ver., 21, 2, ad 2 (III, 11): "Bonum non se extendit ad 
non entra per praedicationem, sed per causalitatem, inquantum non 
entia appetunt bonum. 1t 
33C.G., III, 20 (III, i, 40): "Uam et ipsa non existentia, 
scilicet materia secundum quod intelligitur privationi subiecta:, 
appetit bonum, scilicet esse. Ex quo patet quod etiam sit bona: 
nihil enim appetit bonum nisi bonum." 
34See above, pp. 14 and 15 in the text; also De Veri tate, 21, 
2 c, where St. Thomas treats this point. 
/ 
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"Existence, therefore, has the essential note of goodness.,,35 He 
goes on to.say, "Just as it is impossible, then, for anything to 
be a being which does not have .existence, so too it is necessary 
that every being be good by the very fact of its having existence, 
even though in many beings many other aspects of goodness are add-
ed over and above the act of existing by which they subsist."36 
Accordingly, just as it would be impossible to have a being that 
would not have existence, so would it be necessary to say that e-
very being by the very fact that it has existence is also good. 
St. Thomas then argues for the converse of this proposition. 
"Since • • • good includes the note of being, • • • it is impossi-
ble for anything to be good which is not a being. Thus we are 
left with the conclusion that good and being are interchangeable." 
Since good includes the formality of being, there cannot be a good 
that does not have being; and thus the proposition that good and 
being are interchangeable is true. 
In the Summa Theologiae St. Thomas has a neat proof for the 
statement that every being is good. He argues that, since every 
35De Ver., 2,1, 2 c (III, 11): "Ipsum igitur esse habet ra ... 
tionem bonI:"'" 
36Ibid .:. "Unde sicut impossibile est quod sit aliquod ens 
quod non-Eibeat esse, ita necesse est quod omne ens sit bonum ex 
hoc ipso quod esse habet; quamvis et in quibusdam entibus multae 
rationes bonitatis superadduntur supra suum esse quo subsistunt." 
This last point will be taken up in a later chapter. 
37Ibid.: "Cum autem bonum rationem entis includat, ••• im-
p08sibi~at aliquid esse bonum quod non sit ens; et ita relin-
quitur quod bonum et ens convertuntur." 
j 
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existing being as such has some act, it is therefore perfect to 
some extent, because all act indicates perfection. He further ar-
gues that, since perfection has the formal aspect of being desire-
able in itself and of good, every being is good. "Every being, as 
being, is good. For all being, as being, has actuality and is in 
some way perfect, since every act is some sort of perfection, and 
perfection implies desirability and goodness •••• Hence it fol 
lows that every being as such is good. n38 Consequently, every be-
ing, inasmuch as it is a being, is good. 
Although every good is a being and every being is good, St. 
Thomas notes that the interchangeableness of these two concepts is 
had according to the substantial goodness and substantial being of 
every supposite and not according to the goodness or existence 
that might be accidental to the supposite. In fact, St. Thomas 
lists accidental good as a division of being. nA thing can be 
called good both from its act of existing and frOm some added 
property or state. Thus a man is said to be good both as existing 
and as being just and chaste or destined for beatitude. By reason 
of the first goodness being is interchanged with good, and con-
versely. But by reason of the second, good is a division of be-
ing." 39 It is by reason of a being's substantial goodness and not 
381, 5, 3 c (I, 45): "Omne enim ens, inquantum est ens, est 
in actu, et quodammodo perfectum: quia omnis actus perfectio 
quaedam est. Perfectum vero habet rationem appetibilis et boni • 
• • • Unde sequitur omne ens, inquantum huiusmodi, bonum esse." 
39De Ver., 21, ~, ad 6 (III, 12): ":Aliquid potest dici bonum 
, . . 
/ 
/ 
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its accidental goodness that being and good are interchangeable. 
With this interpretation or the interchangeability of good-
ness and being in mind, another facet of the Thomistic metaphysics 
or the good can be approached, namely, the statement that "Good-
ness and being are really the same, and differ only in idea."40 
By this Thomas means that in the actually existing being the sub-
stantial goodness and the substantial being are one and the samej 
the one cannot be had without the otherj ror, as has been proved, 
every being is good and every good thing is a being. The human 
intellect regarding a being, however, discerns two formalities, 
the existence and the goodness of the being. The being of the 
thing can be considered without any rererence to its goodness, but 
the converse or this is not true, ror the good presupposes and in-
cludes the notion or being. 4l The good is said to add in concept 
alone the formal aspect of that which perfects to the concept of 
being. As Thomas says, "goodness and being are the same really. 
But goodness expresses the aspect of desirableness, which being 
does not expresa.,,4a Good expresses something about a thing that 
et ex suo esse, et ex sua proprietate, vel habitudine superadditaj 
sicut dicitur aliquis homo bonus et in quantum est iustus et cas-
tus, vel ordinatus ad beatitudinem. Ratione igitur primae bonita-
tis ens convertitur cum bono, et e converso; sed ratione secundae 
bonum dividit." 
40S•T., I, 5, 1 c (I, 42): "bonum et ens aunt idem secundum 
rem: dTfferunt secundum rationem_tantum.1t 
rem: 
41In I Sent., 8, 1, 3 c. 
42S•T., I, 5, 1 c (I, 42): 
sed-bonum addit rationem a 
"bonum et ens sunt idem secundum 
etib11is uam non dicit ens." 
being does not express, even though both attributes are one and 
the same in the thing of which they are predicated. 
This discussion of the relationship of good to being opens 
the way for the second topic to be investigated in this chapter, 
namely, the order or rank of the transcendentals among themselves. 
The first thing to be noted is that, since they are inter-
changeable according to the supposite, there can be no order of 
priority among the four transcendental notions of being, one, true~ 
and good from a consideration of the supposlte. Any priority of 
one of these to the other must belong to the order of concepts; 
and, according to this type of consideration, there can be a pri-
ority. "If we compare them to each other, we can do this in two 
ways: either as to their. real subject and in this way they are 
interchangeable with one another and are the same in the rea'l sub-
ject and never are separated; or according to their intellectual 
expression, and in this way being is essentially and logically 
prior to other things. The reason for this is that being is in-
cluded in the notion of these things, whereas the opposite is not 
true. For the first thing that enters the representation of the 
intellects is being, and without this nothing can be grasped by 
the intellect."43 That which precedes all the others is being be-
43In I Sent., 8, 1, 3 c: "Si autem comparemus ea ad invicem, 
hoc potest esse dupliciter: vel secundum suppositumj et sic con-
vertuntur ad invicem, et sunt idem in supposito, nec unquam dere-
linquunt se; vel secundum intentiones eorum; et sic simpliciter et 
absolute ens est prius aliis. Cujus ratio est, quia ens includitu! 
in intellectu eorum, et non e converso. Primum enim quod cadit in 
ima inatione intellectus est ens sine uod sic nihil otest a -
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cause this concept is included in the understanding of all the 
others, whe~eas the converse of this proposition is not true. St. 
Thomas says, further~ore, that, since the one adds only a negation 
it is the closest to being. 44 The question of priority, then, 
will be concerned with the good and the true. 
Aquinas starts his discussion of the priority of truth to 
goodness in the De Veri tate by alluding to a double order that can 
obtain among perfections. 45 The order may be considered from the 
aspect of the things perfected or from the aspect of the perfec-
tions themselves. 
Considered from the aspect of the things perfected, the order 
existing between the true and the good yields the priority to the 
good. 
Si autem attendatur ordo inter verum et bonum ex 
parte perfectibilium, sic bonum est naturaliter prius 
quam verum, duplici ratione. 
a) Primo, quia perfectio boni ad plura se ext en-
dit quam perfectio veri. 
A vero enim non sunt nata perfici nisi illa quae 
possunt aliquod ens percipere in seipsis vel in seipsis 
habere secundum suam rationem, et non secundum illud es-
se quod ens habet in seipso: et huiusmodi sunt solum 
ea quae immaterialiter aliquid recipiunt, et sunt cog-
noscitivaj species enim lapidis est in anima non autem 
secundum esse quod habet in lapide. 
prehendi ab intellectu." Thus Mandonnet has it; Parma reads (cor-
rectly) sine quo (Vol. VI, 69 a). 
44Ibid.: "Unum addit rationemindivisionis; et propter hoc 
est propinquisaimum ad ens, quid addit tantum negationem." 
45De Ver., 21, 3 c: nOrdo autem inter perfectiones poteat 
attendi~uprrciter: uno modo ex parte ipaarum perfectionum: alio 
modo ex parte perfectIbrlium. u ----
Sed a bono nata sunt pertici illa quae secundum ma-
teriale esse aliquid recipiunt: cum ratio boni in hoc 
consistat quod aliquid sit pertectivum tam secundum ra-
tionem speciei quam secundum esse, ut prius dictum est •. 
Et ideo omnia appetunt bonumj sed non omnia cognoscunt 
verum. In utroque enim ostenditur habitudo perfectibi-
lis ad perfectionem, quae est bonum et verumj scilicet 
in appetitu boni et cognitione veri. 
b) Secundo, quia illa quae nata sunt perfici bono 
et vero, per prius perficiuntur bono quam vero: ex hoc 
enim quod participant esse, perficiuntur bono, ut dictum 
est; ex hoc autem quod cognoscunt aliquid, perficiuntur 
vero. Cognitio au-tem est posterior quam essej unde et 
in hac consideratione ex parte perfectibilium bonum 
praecedit verum. 46 
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Thomas alleges two reasons for placing the good prior to the true 
when considered from the viewpoint of the things perfected. The 
first reason is that the perfection of goodness is extended to 
more things than the perfection of truth. For the true can per-
fect only those beings that are endowed with an immaterial cogni-
tive faculty, since conformity with an intellect is the nature of 
truth. All that is necessary to be perfected by the good is exist 
ence. The second reason for putting the good before the true in 
this lineup is that things which are perfected by both the good 
and the true are first perfected by the good. Goodness comes fro 
existence while cognition always follows upon existence. Thus, 
when these two transcendental concepts are considered from the 
point of view of the things perfected, the good takes precedence 
over the true. 
An absolute consideration of the true and the good, that is, 
a consideration of them in their own intelligibility and in them-
selves without reference to anything else, places the true before 
the good. . 
Considerando ergo verum et bonum secundum se, sic 
verum est prius bono secundum rationem, cum sIt perfec-
tivum alicuius secundum rationem speciei; bonum autem 
non solum secundum rationem speciei, sed secundum esse 
quod habet in re. Et ita plura includit in se ratio 
boni quam ratio veri, et se habet quodammodo per addi-
tionem ad illa; et sic bonum praesupponit verum, verum 
autem praesupponit unum, cum veri ratio ex apprehensione 
intellectus perficiatur; unumquodque autem intelligibile 
est in quantum .est unum; qui enim non intelligit unum, 
nihil intelligit, ut dicit Philosoph~8 in IV Metaph. 
Unde istorum nominum transcendentium talls est ordo, 
si secundum se considerentur, quod post ens est unum, 
deinde verum, deinde post verum bonum. 47 
The reason Thomas advances, then, in the Question De Bono for the 
priority of truth over goodness in the absolute order is that the 
true perfects according to the essence of the perfecting being 
whereas the good perfects things according to both its essence and 
its existence. Moreover, the good presupposes the true, which in 
its turn presupposes the one. 
This same question is treated in the Summa Theologiae. 48 Here 
the good and the true are considered only as they are conceived by 
the intellect, or in the absolute order. The same doctrine is 
held as in the De Veritate, but different reasons are proffered. 
"For the true regards being itself absolutely and immediately, 
while the nature of good follows being in so far as being 1s in 
47Ibid. The exact reference to Aristotle's Metaphysics is 
r, 2, l~, 23-32. 
48I, 16, 4 c. It is interesting to note that this comparison 
is made not in the section on good, but in that on the true. 
r--------------------- --
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some way perfect; for thus it is desirable. 1t49 The first of the 
two reaso~s Thomas gives in this work 1s that the true is more 
proximate to being that the go.od. The true regards being 1mmed1-
ately, while the good 1n its perfective capacity is appetible and 
follows upon being. Thus, 1n the absolute order the true is prior 
to the good. 
The second reason given in the Summa Theologiae for. the abso-
lute priority of truth to goodness is the follow1ng: "Secondly, 
it is evident from the fact that knowledge naturally precedes apw 
pet1te. Hence, s1nce the true is related to knowledge, and the 
good to the appetite, the true must be prior in nature to the good 
Since the true is concerned with cognition and the good with ap-
petency, the true is prior to the good because cognition always 
precedes appetite. 
St. Thomas has more to say about the relationship between the 
true and the good in his Commentarium In Epistolam S. Pauli ad He-
braeos. In this work he says: "Although the true and the good, 
when considered absolutely, are interchangeable in their real sub-
jects, they are none the less related to each other in a different 
way inasmuch as they differ logically. For the true 1s in a cer-
49Ibid • (I, 173): tlVerum propinqu1us se habet ad ens, quod 
est priUS;-quam bonum. Naro verum respicit 1psum esse simpliciter 
et immediate: ratio autem boni consequ1tur esse, secundum quod 
est aliquo modo perfectum; sic enim appetibile est." 
50Ibid. ItSecundo apparet ex hoc, quod cogniti~ naturaliter 
praecedit appetitum. Unde cum verum respic1at cognitionem, bonum 
autem appet1tum, prius erit verum quam bonum secundum rat1onem. 1t 
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tain sense good, and the good is in a certain sense true. It is 
the same wa~ with the intellect and will, which are distinguished 
according to the distinction between the true and the good."5l 
This terse opinion of St. Thomas on the subject seems to be the 
best: the two transcendentals in question have different o~de~s 
of priority according to the different viewpoints taken of them. 
Now that the Thomistic metaphysics of the good has been ~e­
viewed, this study can turn toward the Thomistic doctrine on par-
ticipation in general to unde~stand better the position of St. 
Thomas on participation in good. 
51In Heb., c. 11, 1ect. 1 (Parma XlII, 756 b): "Verum, autem~ 
at bonum, etsi in se considerata convertantur quantum ad supposita~ 
tamen inquantum diff'erunt ratione, diverso ordine se habent ad 
invicem: quia et verum est quoddam bonum, et bonum est quoddam 
verum. Et similiter intellectus et voluntas, quae distinguuntur 
penes distinctionem veri et boni." 
CHAPTER II 
THE DOCTRINE OF PARTICIPATION 
AS GIVEN IN THE WORKS OF 
SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS 
Before an adequate treatment of Saint Thomas' doctrine on 
participation in good can be given, an inquir7 must be made into 
the Thomistic position on participation in general. Moreover, 
since this study is concerned with the transcendental notion of 
good and participation therein, the aspect of participation to be 
treated in this chapter will be transcendental participation. The 
other types of participation will be treated inasmuch as they are 
related to transcendental participation. 
The notion of participation was part and parcel of the think-
ing of most of St. Thomas Aquinas' philosophical forebears as well 
as contemporaries. l It should not be surprising then, if it is 
difficult to find a precise and exact meaning of the term partici-
lW. Norris Clarke, S.J., "The Meaning of PartiCipation in St. 
Thomas," The Proceedings of The American Catholic Philosophical 
ASBociation-TWashlngton, D7C.;-I952), p. 150. F'ather Clarke cItes 
St. Bonaventure, In I Sent., D. 8, p. 2, q. 1-2; D. 43, a. 1-3; 
also Peter John Olivi,-gllaest. In II Lib. Sent., q. 16, 'Omnis 
enim forma quae non est in alia a se recepta et participata • • • 
est absolutissima, universallissima, infinitissima et breviter est 
suum ens et ipsemet Deus. R 
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pare in the works of St. Thomas. a 
It shou.ld not be sur'prising that the much-used and -tossed 
about term participate should have different meanings in different 
contexts. L.-B. Geiger, O.P., in his book on Thomistic participa-
tion,3 assigns various non-technical meanings to the terms partici. 
pare and participatio in the works of St. Thomas. 4 Father Geiger 
says that in certain passages participare could be as well render-
ed by habere or reciperej but, in the main, St. Thomas used the 
terms participatio and participare in their technical sense. 5 
What, then, was the technical meaning of participare for St. 
Thomas? In his Commentary ~ the ~ Hebdomadibus of Boethius, the 
Angelic Doctor gives the etymological definition of participare. 
"To participate," he says,"is to receive as it were a part."S 
2Today, certain terms applied to the physical sciences, almost 
defy definition precisely because they are used so much and are so 
familiar. For example, Ernest H. Hutten, writing for The British 
Journal for the Philosophy of Science (May, 1955}, sayS:- nWe only 
slowly work out the meaning, or meanIngs, of a technical term. In 
phYSics, for example, we employ 'electron' in many different ways, 
according to the theories in which the term occursj but I do not 
think there is a single textbook where we could find a definition 
for it." "The Methodology of Psycho-Analysis," p. 81. 
3L~.B. Geiger, O.P., La Participation ~ la Philosophie de 
S. Thomas d'Aquin, 2nd ed.~arIs, 1953). 
4~., pp. 11 & ff. 
5In the text, "Omne quod est participatum in aliquo est in eo 
per modum participantis: quia nihil potest recipere ultra mensura~ 
suam" (In I Sent., 8, 1, a, Contra 2), Geiger says that partici-
thie is a-synonym for recipere; and he seems justified in making 
s statement. See hIs work for further examplesj pp. 11-12, 
note 3; and pp. 145-146, notes 2 & 3. 
6St • Thomas Aquinas, In Librum Boetii De Hebdomadibus Exposi-
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Taking too etymological a view of participation presents the 
danger of misunderstanding the true meaning of metaphysical partic-
ipation. To receive, accept, take, or have a part of anything de-
notes the idea of a division of a whole among several recipients, 
like dividing a pie among four or six people. In the metaphysical 
order, however, such a division is not possible; for act and qual-
ity are simple things. They either are or they are not. "If, 
then, partiCipation is applied to them, this cannot mean to have a 
part, since there are no parts, but to have in a particular, lim-
~, imperfect wayan act and a formality which are found else-
where in a universal, unlimited, and perfect manner. 1t7 
Lest his reader get the idea that metaphysical participation 
might be quantitative, St. Thomas, immediately after the above-
quoted phrase from the Commentary ~ Boethius, adds, "when any-
thing receives in a particular manner that which belongs to anoth-
er in a total manner, it is said to participate it."S Another 
tio, lect. 2; ed. Calcaterra (Turin, 1954), s. Thomae Aquinatis 
~scula Theologica, Vol. II, 396, # 24. St7 Thomas gives the 
same etymology in his· Commentary on the E1istle to the Hebrews, 
!lEst autem participare, partem caperEi':"""n Episto'liiiils. Pauli 
ad Hebraeos EX1ositio, C. 6, lect. 1; S. ¥Somae Aqulnatis Opera 
omnIa (Parma, 852-1873), Vol. XIII, p7 715 b. 
7Fabro, Cornelio, La Nozione Metafisica di Partecipazione se-
condo S. Tommaso d'Aguino, 2nd ed. (TurIn, 1950), p. 316. "Se-
quindi-ad essi si-applica ~l 'partecipare' ciO potra significare 
... 
non l'avere una parte, poiche non vi sono parti, ma l'avere in 
modo 'particolare', 'limitato', 'imperfetto' un atto ed una forma-
lita che altrove 6i trovano in modo totale illimitato e perfetto." 
SIn de Hebd., lect. 2; ed. Calcaterra, p" '376: "quando ali-
quid partICulariter recipit id quod ad alterum pertinet universa-
liter dicitur participare illud. 1I 
_. 
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description of metaphysical participation is to be found in St. 
Thomas' Commentary ~ the Heavens 2£ Aristotle, in which he says, 
tlfor to participate is nothing else than to accept from another in 
a partial manner. 119 
In order to illustrate his doctrine on participation, St. 
Thomas, in the key passage cited from the Commentary ~ the De 
Hebdomadibus of Boethius, offers Bome clear examples of participa-
tion. 
[H]omo dicitur participare animal, quia non habet ratio-
nem animalis secundum totam communitatemj et eadem ra-
tione Socrates participat hOminem; similiter etiam sub-
iectum participat accidens, et materia formam, quia for-
ma substantialis vel accidentalis, quae de sui ratione 
communis est, determinatur ad hoc vel illud subiectum; 
et similiter effectus dicitur participare suam causam, 
et praecipue quando non adaequat virtutem suae causaej 
puta, si dicamus quod aer participat lucem solis1 quia non recipit eam in ea claritate qua est in sole. ° 
Participation, then, seems to mean a beingls partial rec~ption and 
determination of a perfection that belongs to the participated be-
ing in a perfect or complete way.ll 
9In de Caelo et Mundo, Liber II, lectio 18; ed. Spiazzi, S. 
Thomae IQuInatls In~rlstotelis Libros De Caelo et Mundo, De Gen-
eratione et CorruPtions, Meteorolog1corum Exposltro (Turin;-l~), 
p. 233, #463: "nam particlpare nihil aliud est quam ab a110 par-
tialiter acc1pere. u 
lOIn de ~.~ lect. 2. 
llIn many other texts from the writings of St. Thomas these 
fundamental notions of participation are repeated. See In ad Co-
loss., c.l, lect. 4 (Parma, XIII, 536 b): "Participativea11qu1d 
CoiiV'eni t a110 quod excedit suam naturam sed .. tamen a11qu1d de illo 
part1c1pat, sed 1mperfecte: sicut 1ntellectuale hom1ne quod est 
supra rationale, et est essent1ale Angelorum, et idem a11qu1d par-
tlclpat homo"; also In I Met., 10, n. 154 (ed. Spiazzi, 1950, 45 b}: 
"Quod enlm totaliterest aITau1d. non nartic1nat illude sed est 
i 
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The main passage on Thomistic participation, that is, the 
text from the second chapter of Thomas' Commentary ~ the De Reb-
domadibus, gives the three modes or types of participation. These 
are the logical, the predicamental, and the transcendental. Al-
though St. Thomas does not call these kinds of participation by 
these names, he does conceive of them as different modes of par-
ticipation; and, as will be seen, the names suggested here and 
used by modern authors, do fit the different modes to which they 
are applied. 
Further down from the selection already cited,12 Aquinas 
says, "Though we pass over this third ~ of participation for 
the moment, it is impossible for existence itself to partake of 
anything according to the first two types. u13 What should be not-
ed in this quotation is not the doctrine of participation as re-
gards subsistent existence but the fact that Thomas conceived of 
per essentiam idem illl. Quod vero non totallter est allquid, ha-
bens aliau1d aliud adiunctum proprie participare dicitur"; C.G., 
I, 32: 'Omne quod participatur determinatur ad modum participati, 
et sic partialiter habetur et non secundum omnem perfectionis mo-
dumll; and finally, C.G., II, 52: "Quod autem competit alicul se-
cundum propriam naturam suam, non convenit aliis niei per modum 
participationis: sicut calor allis corporlbus ab Igne. Ipsum 
igitur esse competlt omnibus allls a primo agente per particlpa-
tionem quandam. Quod aut em competit alicul per partlcipatlonem, 
non est substantia elus." 
12In de Rebd., lect~ 2; as given above on page 29 of this 
thesis.-- -- ----
13Ib1d • "Praetermisso autem hoc tertl0 modo partlclpandi, 
impossiOIIe est qUOd secundum duos primos modoa-fpsum esse parti-
clpet aliquld. 1I The underscoring is not in the origlnal text. 
/ 
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three modes, types, or kinds of participation. 
The three types of participation are found in the three sets 
of examples given in the main text of Thomistic participation 
quoted above. The first pair of examples are given thus: "Man 
is said to participate in animal because he does not have the na-
ture of animal in its full extension, and in the same way Socrates 
participates in !!!!!!."l4 Man's participation of animal and the in-
dividual's participation of man are examples of a type of partici-
pation which may be called "logical" because these examples of 
participation occur in the order of logical intentions. 
All of the r,emaining examples in the passage cited from the 
Commentary on the De Hebdomadibus concern beings in the real order 
as opposed to the order of logical intentions. The participation 
of a subject in an accident and the partiCipation of matter in 
form are examples of participation in the predicamental division 
of the real order. "Likewise subject participates in accident and 
matter in form because the form (whether substantial or acciden-
tal), which of itself is common, is determined to this or that 
subject. ltl5 This type can be called Itpredicamental participation" 
because subject and accident and matter and form are to be found 
l4Ib id. "fH] orno dicitur participare animal, quia non habet 
rationem animal s secundum totam communitatem; et eadem ratione 
Socrates participat hominem. 1t 
l5Ibid. "Similiter etiam subiectum participat accidens, et 
materia-rO:rmam, quia forma substantialis vel accidentalis, quae de 
sua ratione communis est, determinatur ad hoc vel illud subiectum.' 
--
. ~ 
in the nine categories or predicaments of accidental being. 
The next division of the real order and of metaphysical par-
ticipation refers to transcendentals and can be called "Transcen ... 
dental participation." "In the same wayan effect is said to par-
-
ticipate in its cause, especially when it does not measure up to 
the power of its cause. Suppose, for instance, that we should sa 
that the air participates in the light of the sun, because it does 
not receive the light with the same brilliance that it has in the 
sun."16 
It should be noted that St. Thomas does not mean that all 
causality is an instance of transcendental participation. For in-
stance, when a dog generates an offspring, there is no question of 
transcendental causality because both beings are of the same spe-
cies. In order to avoid giving the impression that all causality 
is transcendental, Aquinas says that an effect is said to particio-. 
pate in its cause "especially when it does not measure up to the 
power of its cause.,,17 This is the case, for example, when air is 
said to share the sun's light. The air has the same kind of light 
that the sun has, but the air does not possess the light with the 
same degree of brilliance that it is present in the sun. 
If the cause and the effect are of the same species, as is 
16Ibid. 
et praecipue 
dicamus quod 
ea claritate 
17Ibid. 
"Similiter effectus dicitur participare suam causam, 
quando non adaequat virtutem suae causae; puta, si 
aer participat lucem soliS, quia non recipit eam in 
qua est in sole. 1t 
J 
,. 
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true in the case of generation within a species, the part1pipation 
is univocal or "pre.dicamental" because both beings participate in 
the same kind of form. When the cause and the effect are from 
different grades of being, however, as is the case in the causali-
ty exercised by the Creator toward the creature, the participation 
had by the creature is said to be analogous or transcendental. 
Since this study is concerned with the participation of one 
of the transcendental notions, that of the good, it will be neces-
sary to examine closely the nature of transcendental participation 
Before a treatment of this third mode of participation is presen-
ted, however, a brief' look into logical and predicamental partici-
pation will be in order. 
As has been seen, S. Thomas' first example of participation 
comes from the field of logic: uman is said to participate in 
animal because he does not have the nature of animal in its full 
extension, and in the same way Socrates participates in man. o18 
What should be noted here is that, even though a thing can be 
predicated by participation, still, if it actually belongs to the 
essence of the participant, it is also predicated of it substan-
tially. It was Plato's opinion that something could not be predi-
cated through participation and substantially at the same timej 
Thomas, however, says, "According to the opinion of Aristotle, who 
held that ~ truly is what animal is (as though the essence of 
18Ibid • The original Latin is given in note 14 on page 29 
of the text above. 
j 
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animal did not exist apart from the specific difference of man), 
nothing stands in the way of the substantial predication of some-
thing that is had through participation." 19 Aristotle, then, did 
not share Plato's belief that what was predicated substantially 
could not be predicated participatively also. 
Plato's doctrine of sUbsistent ideas called for actually 
existing universal ideas that maintained themselves apart from the 
concrete singulars, the objects of sense knowledge. These latter 
were merely imitations of the universal ideas, which were more 
real than the objects of sense knowledge. 20 Such a doctrine would 
exclude the possibility of substantial and participative predica-
tion at one and the same time; for what is predicated by partici-
pation is predicated of the concrete singular, and this cannot be 
but an imitation of the universal idea of which the essence in 
question is predicated substantially. Aristotle, on the other 
hand, held that in the predication of a genus or species the at-
tribute had to be possessed substantially by that being of which 
it is predicated if the predication were to be valid. When man is 
said to be an animal, man substantially possesses the notes of the 
concept animal. 
19Ibid ., lect. 3: "Sed secundum aententiam Aristotelis, qui 
posuit quod homo vere est id quod est animal, quasi essentia anima. 
lis non existente praeter differentiam hominis; nihil prohibet, id 
quod per participationem dicitur, substantialiter praedicari." 
20See Plato's Republic, Bk. VI, 507 b; also Aristotle's Meta-
physics, A, 6, 987 b. 
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Aristotle could maintain this doctrine because he held that 
the universal idea did not exist apart from the singulars of which 
it is predicated except in the mind. Consequently, the concrete 
singular could possess the attribute essentially; man could be 
said to be truly that which is contained in the concept of animal 
and at the same time man could be said to participate in the uni-
versal idea of animal. The idea of animal, then, exists formally 
in the mind, while the foundation for the valid content of the 
idea exists only in those beings that are the inferiors of the 
genus animal. 
Later on, it will be seen that participation of a perfection 
and possession of that perfection in a substantial sense or by es-
sence cannot be had in the transcendental or predicamental type of 
participation. That Thomas, however, is speaking in this passage 
of logical and not real participation is abundantly clear from the 
text, in which immediately before the passage.cited above21 he 
says he is referring to "another type of participation, in which 
namely species participates genus.,,22 Therefore, it is seen that 
predication of a perfection by participation and in a SUbstantial 
sense is possible in the logical order; but such simultaneous 
predication cannot be had in the real order. 
In his Com.'TIentary .2!!. the Metaphysics of Aristotle, St. Thomas 
i~ affact ccr~v=cr~tes ~tat ~as oaan said above, namely, that in 
. .) 1 
- In de Hebd., le~t. 3, as quoted on p. 33 or this study. 
22Ibid. 
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logical participation, essential and participative predication can 
be had at one and the same time; he also gives a clear example of 
what he means. 
Ea de quibus genus praedicatur secundum participationem 
non possunt definiri per illud genus, nisi sit de essen-
tia illius definiti. Sicut ferrum ignitum, de quo ig-
nis per participationem praedicatur, non definitur per 
ignem sicut per genus; quia ferrum non est per essentiam 
suam ignis, sed participat aliquid eius. Genus autem 
non praedicatur de speciebus per participationem, sed 
per essentiam. Homo enim est animal essentialiter, non 
solum aliquid ani~alis participans. Homo enim est quod 
verum est animal. 3 
When iron is said to be red-hot or fiery, it is not meant that 
fire is of the essence of iron, but that the iron participates in 
some of the perfection of fire. When a man is said to be an ani- ", 
mal, however, it means that man is by his own nature (that is, 
essentially) an animal and that what is truly said of an animal 
pertains to man. In the case of man and animal it is not meant 
that man merely participates in some of the perfections that are 
found in the notion of animal; for man has all the perfections of 
animal, even though these perfections are specified or determined 
by man's rationality. Man is said to have all of the notes of an-
imal because genus is not predicated of its species by participa-
24 
tion but essentially. 
23In VII Met., 3, n. 1328. 
24St • Thomas' statement here about genus being predicated es-
sentially and not through participation seems to contradict what 
has been said above about simultaneous essential and participative 
predication. In the light of the following text from the Summa ~', 
Contra Gentiles (see note 25) it would seem that Thomas meant that 
an attribute could be predicated essentially of something that 
i 
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Another interesting text on logical participation is the fol 
lowing taken from the Summa Contra Gentiles. "Whatever is predi-
cated univocally of several things belongs by participation to 
each of the things of which it is predicated: for the species is 
said to participate the genus, and the individual the species. 
But nothing is said of God by participation, since whatever is 
participated is confined to the mode of a participated thing, and 
thus is possessed partially and not according to every mode of 
perfection."25 This text highlights the participation of species 
in genus and of the individual in the species that is had in uni-
vocal predication. Although it omits the aspect of substantial 
participation on the part of the participant, it does bring out 
the fact of limitation on the part of the participating subject 
by the statement that whatever possesses something by participa-
tion does not possess the thing in question in its totality of 
perfection. The reason for the omission of the point on substan-
tial participation, no doubt, is that Thomas is here talking of 
the difference between univocal or predicamental predication and 
transcendental predication. Bringing in the matter of substantia 
possession in logical participation would only confuse the issue. 
possesses the quality by participation and in this sense the at-
tribute is predicated not participatively but essentially. 
25C.G., I, 32 (I, 77): "Orone quod de pluribus praedicatur 
univoce; secundum participationem cuilibet eorum convenit de quo 
praedicatur: nam species participare dicitur genus, et indivi-
viduum speciem. De Deo autem nihil dicitur per participationem: 
nam omne quod participatur determinatur ad modum participati, et 
sic artiallter habetur et non secundum omnem erfectionls modum." 
-. 
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The next consideration will be that of the participation had 
in the pred;camental order, which is concerned with substance and 
its attributes. It will be seen how substance participates in the 
perfection of certain accidents and how matter participates in 
form. In treating predicamental participation here, the order of 
St. Thomas is being followed; for Thomas mentions examples of pre-
dicamental participation in his Commentary .2!! the De Hebdomadibus 
of Boethius after the examples of logical participation. 26 
Predicamental or categorical participation deals directly wit 
the real order and not directly with logical intentions, as is the 
case with logical participation. The substance, for example, ~, 
actually participates in the perfection of the accident under con-
sideration, white for example. 
Predicamental participation is, therefore, real participation 
and as such it constitutes with transcendental participation a di-
vision or mode of participation that is opposed to the logical 
type. 
In his Commentary ~ the Book of ~ Sentences, St. Thomas 
gives a description of predicamental participation that is clearly 
exemplified. "Some things happen to be called 'alike' ••• be-
cause they participate in the same form, as two white things par-
ticipate in whiteness. 1t27 In this type of participation both be ... 
26See page 29 of this thesis. 
2.7In I Sent., 48, 1, 1 sol.: IIContingi t autem aliqua dici 
similia--. • :-ex eo quod participant unam formam, sicut duo albi 
albedinem. II 
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ings, or any number of beings for that matter, participate in the 
same form; hence this type of participation has been called uni-
vocal participation by some (although it will continue to be re-
ferred to in this paper as predicamental). Of course, it should 
be remembered that by the same form here is meant the same type of 
form, not the same numerical form. This is an example of two sub-
stances participating in the perfection of an accident, as des-
cribed in the Commentary ~ the de Hebdomadibus of Boethius. 28 
After describing this univocal or predicamental participation 
in the above-cited passage from the Commentary ~ the Sentences, 
St. Thomas goes on to say, Itthus all similar things must be com-
posite beings. n29 It is important to note that predicamental par-
ticipation takes place between beings that are composites, com-
posed of matter and form, and substance and accidents. It will be 
seen that this is not true in transcendental participation, where 
the participated being ,is not composite but Simple and the partic-
ipatd.ng being may be simple in essence, as in an angel. 
What is the nature of the form that is partiCipated in by the 
composite participating being? Thomas says that it is a partici-
pated form. 30 The form is participated inasmuch as it is a con-
28Lect • 2. This type of conformity is also described in the 
De Veritate, 23, 7, ad 10: "Creatura non dicitur conformari Deo 
quasi participa.nti eamdem formam quam ipsa participat."· 
29In I Sent., 48, 1, 1 sol.: "et sic orone simile oportet 
esse composi tum. It 
nForma • • • quae est pars compositi, 
~. 
, , 
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stituent element of the essence or something added thereto. 
St. Tho~as also tells us that the participating subject, ei-
ther the substance or the matter, is compared to the accident or 
form as potency is to act. 3l 
In predicamental participation, then, several beings can shar 
the same attribute or form (1) fully, (2) equally, (3) and as a 
part. 32 Another feature of this second type of partiCipation is 
the actual existence of the participated quality only in the par-
ticipating subject. According to St. Thomas, who follows Aristot-
le in this particular, there is no substantial humanity or subsis-
tent whiteness, as Plato would have it. These qualities exist 
only in the concrete singulars from which they are abstracted. 
Therefore, as is the case with logical participation, the par 
ticipated form in predicamental participation (although it has an 
intentional existence "in the intellect) exists in the real order 
only in those singulars which participate in it and of which it is 
predicated. 
31C.G., II, 53, Item: "Orone participans aliquid compara tur 
ad ipsum quod participatur ut potentia ad actum. 1I St. Thomas says 
the same thing in S.T., I, 75, 5, ad 4: "Orone participatum com-
paratur ad participans ut actus eius." 
32These qualities are suggested by Pabro in his ~ Nozione 
Metafisica (p. 319). F'abro's schema, which purports to provide a 
summary of all the expressions used by St. Thomas regarding par-
ticipation, adds a fourth note about predicamental partiCipators, 
possession of the quality as something existing of the essence of 
the thing ("sicut aliquid existens de essentia rei"). This last 
characteristic would not be true of a subject's participation in 
accident or of matter's participation in form. Pabro's schema, 
then, seems to attribute too much to predicamental participation. 
41 
In the text quoted from the Commentary ~ the de Hebdomadibus 
of Boethius 1 st. Thomas describes the third and last kind of'par-
ticipation: "in like manner an effect is said to participate its 
cause, and especially when it does not equal the power of its 
cause, as, if we should say that the air participates the light of 
the sun because it does not receive it in that brilliance which it 
is in the sun.,,33 That Thomas says, "especially when it the ef-
fect does not equal the power of ita cause" seems to indicate 
that he is referring here not to univocal causality, that of gen-
eration within a species for example l but of analogous causality, 
not of secondary causes but principally of the first cause. As 
has been seen, this third type of participation has been called 
transcendental or analogous participation by modern writers on the 
subject. 34 
Thomas describes the difference between predicamental and 
transcendental participation in this way: "Agreement can be had 
in two ways: (1) either between two things participating in some 
one thing, and such agreement cannot be had between Creator and 
creature • . . , (2) or according as one thing exists of itself 
and absolutely and the other being participates in it as much as 
it can in a likeness of it. This would be the case, for instance, 
if we supposed that h~at existed without matter and fire agreed 
33In de Hebd., lect. 2. 
34This third type of participation will continue to be called 
transcendental in this study. 
j 
42 
with it by participating in some of the heat. Such agreement can 
be had between a creature and God, for God is called a being be-
cause He is His very own existence. A creature, however, is not 
its very own existence, but is called a being as something partic-
ipating in existence. tt35 Logical or predicamental participation 
is had when two participants share the same kind of nature or 
quality. Transcendental participation, however, is different in 
this respect. Transcendental participation concerns two beings: 
one which possesses an attribute by virtue of its own essence and 
according to all of the perfections of the attribute and the other 
being participates in the perfection of this higher being by vir-
tue of a likeness of the perfection possessed essentially by the 
higher being. 
From the text just cited two things are apparent about trans-
scendental participation: one, that it is had ultimately between 
creature and Creator; the other, that it concerns likenesses or 
similarities. The relation between creature and Creator will be 
treated elsewhere; similitude or likeness will be considered here. 
The creature is said to participate in a likeness (similitudo 
35In II Sent., 16, 1,1, ad 3: "Convenientia potest esse du-
pliciter: aut duorum participantium aliquod unum: et talis con-
venientia non potest esse Creatoris et creaturae • • • ; aut se-
cundum quod unum per se est simpliciter, et alterum participat de 
similitudine eius qu~ntum potest: ut si poneremus calorem esse 
sine materia, et ignem conveniri cum eo ex hoc quod aliquid calo-
ris participaret: et talis convenientia esse potest creaturae ad 
Deum: quia Deus dicitur ens hoc modo quod est ipsum suum esse: 
creatura vero non estipsum suum esse, sed dicitur ens quasi esse 
participans." 
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of God. This calls to mind the Platonic doctrine of participation 
wherein the concrete, existing, sensible object is said to be an 
imitation (eikon or mimesis) of the separately subsisting reality. 
An important fact to be noted about St. Thomas' doctrine on 
similitudo is that there can be similarity or likeness only among 
those beings which are different in some respects. "There cannot 
be likeness where there is no diversity."36 If there were no di-
versity between the two beings that are said to be alike, there 
could be no similarity because there would only be identity. 
The next thing to be noted about similarity is that it is a 
sort of relation;37 the relation exists between the two beings 
that are said to be similar. The exact nature of this relation 
will be investigated elsewhere. 
In the Summa Theologiae St. Thomas distinguishes three types 
of likene s s : 
rQ]uaedam enim dicuntur similia, quae communicant in ea-
dem,forma secundum eandem rationem, et secundum eundem 
modum: et haec non solum dicuntur simi11a, sed aequa11a 
in sua similitudinej sicut duo aequaliter alba, dicuntur 
similia in albedine. Et haec est perfect1ssima s1m11i-
tudo.--Alio modo d1cuntur similia quae communicant in 
forma secundum eandem rat1onem, et non secundum eundem 
modum, sed secundum magis et minus; ut m1nus albUm d1ci-
tur s1mile magis albo. Et haec est s1m1litudo imperfec-
ta.--Tertio modo dicuntur aliqua similia, quae communi-
cant in eadem forma, sed non secundum eandem rationemj 
36In IV Sent., 40, 1, 2, ad 4: "S1militudo non poteat esse 
ubi nonest aliqua diversitas." See also S.T., III, 5, 1, ad 3; 
22, 1, ad 2; 46, 4, ad 1; where Thomas quotes St. John Damascene 
in this regard. 
37"Relatl0 quaeda.m," C.G., II, 11, Adhuc. 
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ut patet in agentibus non univocis. 38 
The three ki~ds of similaritYI then l are: (l) perfect l which is 
had among beings possessing the same attribute according to the 
same nature an in the same measure; (2) imperfect l or that which 
is had among beings sharing the same attribute according to the 
same nature but note in the same measure; and (3) £££-univocal l 
or that which is had among beings only analogously agreeing l which 
share the same attribute but not according to the same nature. 
This third type may rightly be called transcendental or analogous 
similari ty. 
Since transcendental similarity is the type most to the pur-
pose of this studYI a further investigation of its nature is in 
order. Moreoever l a treatment of this particular type follows im-
mediately upon the passage just quoted above; for in this article 
of the Summa Theologiae St. Thomas is speaking of a creature's 
similarity to God. 
; ;, 
Cum enim omne agens agat sibi simile inquantum est agens l 
agit autem unumquodque secundum suam formaml necesse est 
quod in effectu sit similitudo formae agentis. Si ergo 
agens sit contentum in eadem specie cum suo effectu l erit 
similitudo inter f'aciens et factum in formal secundum ean-
dem rationem speciei; sicut homo generat hominem. Si 
autem agens non sit contentum in eadem specie, erit si-
militudo, sed non secundum eandem rationem speciei: si-
cut ea quae generantur ex virtute solis, accedunt quidem ii., 
ad aliquam similitudinem solis, non tamen ut recipiant 
formam solis secundum similitudinem speciei l sed secun-
dum similitudinem generis. 
Si igitur sit allquod agens, quod non in genere con--
tineatur l effectus eius adhuc magis accedent remote ad 
38 S.T. I II 4, 3 c. 
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similitudinem formae agentis: non tamen ita quod parti-
cipant similitudinem formae agentis secundum eandem ratio-
nem speciei aut generis, sed secundum aliqualem analogiam, 
sicut fpsum esse est commune omnibus. 39 
The first example of likeness given here is between univocal be-
ings, such as sire and offspring of the same species. The other 
two examples are of likenesses between non-univocal or analogous 
beings, both of them representing cause and effect; but in the 
first of these second two examples the effect is outside the spe-
cies but not outside the genus of the cause, while in the second 
example the effect has for its cause a being which cannot be con-
tained within a genus. As will be seen, it is this type of like-
ness that is had between God and creatures. It is the most remote 
of all the types of similitude, but it is a likeness nonetheless. 
For, although the similarity that creatures bear toward their Cre-
ator is imperfect,40 still, inasmuch as each creature possesses a 
perfection, it bears some resemblance to God. 4l 
St. Thomas tells us that creatures are like God according to 
the third type of likenes s, that of analogous likenes s. It[ E] very 
creature represents Him and is like Him so far as it possesses 
some perfection: yet not so far as to represent Him as something 
of the same species or genus, but as the superabounding source of 
whose form the effects fall short, although they derive some kind 
39Ibid. 
40S.T., I, 13, 5, ad 2. 
4lIbid •. , corpus. 
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of likeness thereto, even as the forms of inferior bodies repre-
sent the powe~ of the sun."42 The creature, inasmuch as it has 
any perfection, is a likeness of Godj but it does not represent 
God as though it were of the same species or genus of God but as 
something falling far short of the divine model in regard to form, 
manner, and measure of existence. Fabro calls this likeness a 
"similitudine degradata," a likeness on a lower level of being. 43 
Aquinas tells us, furthermore, that in the non-univocal or 
analogous cause the likeness of the effect is to be found in a 
higher manner, while in the effect the likeness of the cause is 
present in a lesser degree. 44 
But where is the likeness of the effect found in the higher 
analogous cause? In the divine intellect, according to St. Thom-
as: "Although creatures are not so perfect as to be specifically 
like God in nature, after the manner in which a man begotten is 
like to the man begetting, still they do attain to likeness to 
Him, according to the representation in the examplar known by God; 
just as a material house is like the house in the architect's 
42Ibid ., artic le 2, c: II [Ql uaeli bet creatura intantum eum 
Deum repraesentat, et est ei si~11is, inquantum perfectionem ali-
quam habet: non tamen ita quod repraesentet eum sicut aliquid 
eiusdem speciei vel generis, sed sicut excellens principium, a cu-
ius tamen aliqualem s1militudinem effectus consequunturj sicut 
formae corporum inferiorum repraesentant virtutem solarem." 
43La Nozione Metafisica, p. 318. 
44C.G., II, 98, Dicunt: "In causis autem non univocis simi-
litudo effectus est in causa eminentius, causae autem in effectu 
inferiori modo." 
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mind."45 The creature is said to be like God inasmuch as it is 
like an ide~ of itself which is in the divine intellect, just as 
the house which has been built is like the idea of itself that was 
conceived in the mind of the architect long before the house was 
constructed. 
What is the content of the idea in the divine mind? St. 
Thomas says that this idea contains the natures of things. There 
is in the divine mind an idea of everything that exists in reali-
ty: It[TJhe essences of things as existing in the knowledge of God 
are called ideas. 1t46 
This participation in God according to the creature's like-
ness to God is had on the part of the creature according to its 
form. If Since it is from the form that a thing has its being; and 
since a thing, inasmuch as it has being, approaches to a likeness 
of God, Who is His own simple being: it follows of necessity that 
the form is nothing else than a participation of the divine simil-
itude in things. Wherefore Aristotle, speaking of the form, right 
ly says (I Phys. ix.) that it is something godlike and desirable." 7 
45S.T., I, 44, 3, ad 1 (I, 430): ItLicet creaturae non per-
tingant-ad hoc quod sint similes Deo secundum suam naturam, simili 
tudine speciei, ut homo genitus homini generantii attingunt tamen 
ad eius similitudinem secundum repraesentationem rationis intel-
lectae a Deo, ut domus quae est in materia, domui quae est in men-
te artificis." 
46S•T., I, 14, praef. (I, 135): It[R]ationes autem rerum se-
cundum quod sunt in Deo cognoscente, ideae vocantur." 
47C.G., III, 97 (IV, 47): "Cum enim forma sit secundum quam 
res habet-esse; res autem quaelibet secundum quod habet'esse, ac-
cedat ad similitudinem Dei ui est i sum esse sim lex· necease 
j 
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For the creature, its form is the divine likeness participated. 
That Thomas equivalates the form of a being with the likeness of 
God in which the creature participates, should be clear from this 
passage. 
The notion of likeness is definitely at home in the realm of 
formal causality and its subdivision of exemplary causality. A 
creature is like God, made unto His image and likeness, because by 
virtue of God's power and providence it possesses a form and the 
exemplary cause of this is contained in the divine mind. This no-
tion of similitude or likeness belongs to the static or essential 
side of participation, that is, to the province of formal and exem 
plary causality; formal on the part of the creature, exemplary on 
the part of the Creator. 
As a kind of summary of St. Thomas' main ideas on similitudo 
and an introduction to the existential or dynamic element in par-
ticipation, the following passage from the Summa Contra Gentiles 
is apt. 
Effectus enim a suis causis deficientea non conveniunt 
cum eia in nomine et ratione, necease eat tamen aliquam 
inter ea similitudinem inveniri: de natura enim actio-
nis est ut agens sibi simile agat, cum unumquodque agat 
secundum quod actu est. Unde forma effectus in causa 
excedente invenitur quidem aliqualiter, sed secundum 
alium modum et aliam rationem, ratione cuius causa ae-
quivoca dicitur. Sol enim in corporibus inferioribus 
calorem causat agendo secundum quod actu est; unde 
est quod forma nihil ait aliud quam divina similitudo participata 
in rebus; unde convenienter Aristoteles, in I Physic., de forma 
loquens, dicit quod est divinum quoddam et ~ibile." The 
exact reference to the Physics is I, 9, I92~a;-r8. 
oportet quod calor a sole generatus a11qualem s1m111tu-
d1nem obt1neat ad v1rtutem act1vam so11s, per quam calor 
1n istis inferioribus causatur, ratione cuius sol calidus 
dicitur, quamv1s non una ratione. Et sic sol omnibus il-
11s simi11s a11qua11ter dicltur in qu1bus suos effectus 
eff1cac1ter 1nducit: a qu1bus tamen rursus omnibus dis-
sim111s est, inquantum hu1usmodi effectus non eodem modo 
poss1dent calorem et huiusmodo quo in sole inven1tur. 
Ita et1am et Deus omnes perfect10nes rebus tribuit, ac 
per hoc cum omnibus sim11itudinem habet et d1ssim11itu-
dinem simul. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
••• S1m11e en1m a11cu1 d1c1tur quod e1us possidet qua-
litatem vel formam. Qu1a igitur id quod in Deo perfecte 
est, 1n rebus a11is per quandam def1c1entem part1c1pat1-
onem 1nven1tur, 111ud secundum quod s1m11itudo attend1-
tur, De1 qu1dem simpliciter est, non autem creaturae. 
Et sic creatura habet quod De1 est: unde et Deo recte 
simi11s dicitur. 48 
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All beings tend to produce things that are 11ke themselves. For 
this reason, creatures .bear some resemblance to God, their Creator 
From the point of view of the creatures, they are sa1d to be like 
God because they part1cipate in the divine essence through a like-
ness of God. The likeness is the sim11itude of one or more of the 
perfect10ns of God. These perfections are present in the1r high-
est degree 1n God but in a lesser degree 1n creatures. 
The other main aspect of participat10n to be considered is 
the dynam1c or existent1al, which 1nvolves the creature's receiv-
ing and actualizing a form by virtue of the d1vine operations of 
creation, conservation, and providence. The last of these three 
operations pertains to final causality; the first two belong prin-
cipally to effic1ent causality. 
Nowhere does Thomas exp11citly state that part1cipation 1n-
48 C.G., I, 29. 
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volves efficient causality, but the close connection between the 
two concepts. is implied in many places. For example, in the opus-
culum De Ente et Essentia, there is the statement: "Now, whatever 
belongs to a being is either caused by the principles of its na-
ture, as the capability of laughter in man, or it comes from some 
extrinsic principle, as light in the air from the sun's influence. 
But it is impossible that the act of existing be caused by a 
thing's form or its quiddity, (I say caused as by an efficient 
cause); for then something would be the cause of itself and would 
bring itself into existence--which is impossible. Everything, 
then, which is such that its act of existing is other than its na-
ture must needs have its act of existing from something else."49 
Although there is no explicit mention of participation here, sev-
eral of its elements are in evidence: (l) causality, and then two 
results of causality, (2) the reception of a perfection from an 
extrinsic being, and (3) existence from another being. Thomas, 
however, does explicitly state here that the being that does not 
possess existence in its own essence must have it from another as 
49De Ente et Essentia, C. IV; ed. Perrier, Opuscula Omnia 
necnon opera-Minora, I, Opera Philosophica (Paris, 1949), 41, n. 
22 (On BeIn~ and Essence, trans. Armand Augustine Maurer, C.S.B •. 
('roronto, 1 4W-; p. 47): "Omne autem quod convenit alicui, vel 
est causatum ex principiis naturae suae, sicut risibile in homine, 
vel advenit ab aliquo principio extrinseco, sicut lumen in aere 
ex influentia solis. Non autem potest esse quod ipsum esse sit 
causatum ab ipsa forma vel quidditate rei, dico sicut a causa ef-
ficientej quia sic aliqua res esset causa sui ipsius, et aliqua 
res seipsum in esse produceret, quod est impossibile. Ergo opor-
tat quod omnis talis res, cuius esse est aliud quam natura sua, 
habeat esse ab alio." 
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from an efficient cause. It would seem l therefore l that St. Thom-
as considered efficient causality as closely related to participa-
tion l if not essential to the doctrine. 
Another text which implies the close relation between the no-
tion of participation and efficient causality is the following: 
1'[WJhatever is found in anything by participation must be caused in 
it by that to which it belongs essentiallYI as iron becomes heated 
by fire. 1150 Although there is no explicit mention made of effici-
ent causality here l it may be reasonably inferred l because the 
production of red-hot iron (as in the example above) would necessi-
tate l besides the form of fire, an agent causing its actual exis-
tence. 
As is evident from the passage just quoted from the Summa 
Theolo iae, causality with its concomitant notion of dependence of 
effect on cause is a topic closely connected with participation. 51 
he reason for this close coru1ection is that participation by its 
very notion connotes rec~ption and passivity, and demands an agent 
to fulfill its act of participating. 
Also closely connected with the idea of participation is the 
fact that the perfection caused in the participant must belong 
substantially or essentially to the ultimate cause. St. Thomas 
50S.T., I, 44, 1 c (I, 427): II[Sli ••• aliquid invenitur in 
aliquo per participationem, necesse est quod causetur in ipso ab eo 
cui essentialiter convenitj sicut ferrum fit ignitum ab igne. tt 
510f • also S.T., I, 44, 4, arg. lj 49, 3, arg. 4; 61, 1 Cj 65 1 
4, arg. 2j 96, l-c; and O.G., I, 98. 
;> 
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does not mention ultimate cause in his treatment of these matters; 
but it may ~e legitimately supposed that he means this here be-
cause in the passages in which he speaks of participation in the 
transcendental sense5~ he is speaking of the operations of God to-
ward creatures. 
The first of the operations of God as efficient cause that 
will be considered is creation. This act of the Divinity is de-
fined by the Angelic Doctor as the production of a thing in its 
entire substance, with nothing being presupposed either created or 
uncreated. 53 St. Thomas further describes creation as the ema-
nation of all being from non-being which is nothing. 54 It is the 
production of the complete being with nothing presupposed as re-
gards matter or the like. Man is created, says Thomas, from that 
which is not man; and whiteness is created from that which is not 
white. 55 
Thomas also holds that a necessary part of creation is the 
creation of prime matter and passive potency. n[IJt is necessary 
to say that even prime matter is created by the universal cause of 
52See any of the texts cited in the preceding note or S.T., 
I, 44, 1 c, as given in note 50. 
53S.T., I, 65, 3 c: "Creatio ••• est productio alicuius 
rei secundum suam totam substantiam, nullo praesupposito quod sit 
vel increatum vel ab aliquo creatum." 
54 1 Ibid., 45, c: 
quod est nihil." 
"emanatio totius esse • • • ex non ente 
55Ibid.: "homo fit ex non-homine, et album ex non-albo." 
Thomas has a fuller treatment of these points in his In II Sent., 
112 
",: 
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things. tt56 The reason is that, if the entire supposite is a cre-
ated being, everything pertaining to the being must be created, 
even if it be prime matter or passive potency. Otherwise, a part 
of the created being would be uncreated, which would be a contra-
diction. "[IJ t is necessary that even what is potential in it 
should be created, if all that belongs to its being is created.,,57 
Not only are all creatures created by God;58 but it is only 
God--the first cause, the prime mover, the absolute being, exis-
tence itself--Who can create anything. God, according to Thomas' 
natural theology, cannot even delegate the act of creation to any 
creature. "[IJ t is impossible for any creature to create, either 
by its own power, or instrumentally--that is, ministerially.,,59 
This total and complete production of the creature by the 
Creator indicates a relation of total dependence of creature on 
God. II [c] reation in the creature is only a re lation of a certain 
kind to the Creator as to the principle of its being.,,60 This 
56Ibid., 44, 2 c (I, 429): "oportet ponere etiam materiam 
primam ~tam ab universali causa entium." 
57Ibid ., ad 3 (I, 429): "oportet quod etiam illud quod se 
habet ex parte potentiae, sit creatum, si totum quod ad esse ip-
sius pertinet, creatum est." 
58Ibid., 45, 2 c; 44, 1 c. 
59Ibid., 45, 5 c (I, 440): lIimpossibile est quod aliC\1i cre-
aturae C'OrlVeniat creare, neque virtute propria, neque instrumenta-
liter sive per ministerium. 1I The same is said in 65, 3 c. 
60Ibid., 45, 3 c (I, 437): "creatio in creatura non sit nisi 
relatio quaedam ad Creatorem, ut ad principium sui esse; sicut in 
passione quae est cum motu, importatur relatio ad principlum motus. I 
54 
"relation of a certain kind" is a real relation in the creature 
but not in God; in God the relation is mBrely rational inasmuch as 
the creatures are referred to Him.. "[eJ rea ture s are really re-
lated to God Himself; whereas in God there is no real relation to 
creatures, but a relation only in idea, inasmuch as creatures are 
related to Him."61 
creatures is His conservation of creatures in the state of being. 
In the Summa Theologiae Thomas states that the being of each and 
every creature so depends upon God that not for a moment could the 
creature exist if it were not kept in being by the operation of 
the divine power. "For the being of eyery creature depends on God 
so that not for a moment could it subsist, but would fall into no-
thingness, were it not kept in being by the operation of the di-
vine power. "62.. In the same article Thomas illustrates this teach-
ing with one of his crystal-clear examples. 
Sic autem se habet omnis creatura ad Deum, sicut aer ad 
solem illuminantem. ~icut enim sol est lucens per suam 
naturam, aer autem fit luminosus participando lumen al 
sole, non tamen participando naturam solis; ita solus 
Deus est ens per essentiam suam, quia eius essentia est 
61Ibid., 13, 7 c (I, 124): "creaturae realiter referuntur ad 
ipsum Deum; sed in Deo non est aliqua realis relatio eius ad crea-
turas, sed secundum rationem tantum, inquantum creaturae referun-
tur ad ipsum." Also see 6, 2, ad 1; 13, 7, ad 2, 4, & 5; 32, 2 c; 
45, 3, ad 1; and III, 2, 7 c. 
62Ibid ., I, 104, 1 c (I, 963): "Dependet enim esse cuius-
libet creaturae a Deo, ita quod nec ad momentum subsistere pos-
sent, sed in nihilum redigerentur, nisi operatione divinae virtu-
tis conserverentur in esse." 
" 
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suum esse; omnis autem creatura est ens participative, 
non quod sua essentia sit eius esse. Et ideo, ut Augus-
tinus dicit IV super Gen. ad litt., virtus Dei ab eis 
quae creata sunt regendis si cessaret aliquando, simul 
et illorum cessaret species, omnisque natura concideret. 63 
Just as the air would have no light if the sun would cease to 
shine, so every creature, which participates in the existence of 
God, Who is His own existence, would cease to exist if the ruling 
power of God were withdrawn from His creatures. 
The last phase of existential partiCipation to be considered 
is God's providence over creatures. This aspect of the question 
is concerned with God as the greatest good and last end of all 
creatures. Hence it presents the notion of God as the final cause 
of all created being. 
The Angelic Doctor states that the plan of all things as di-
rected toward their final end is providence. 64 He also divides the 
notion of providence into two divisions: (1) first there is the 
order of things that are ordained beforehand to their end; and, 
then, (2) there is the execution of this order, which is called 
government. 65 It would seem that both the plan of creatures di-
rected toward their end and the execution of this plan by God re-
fer to His final causality_ 
64Ibid ., :3 c: URatio autem ordinandorum in finem, proprie 
providentia est." 
65Ibid. "Ad providentiam duo pertinent: scilicet ratio or-
dinis rerum provisarum in finem; et executio huius ordinis, quae 
gubernatio dicitur." Thomas also describes providence as the chief 
Ipart of orudence. "prlncipalis pars prudentlae" (Ibid •• 1 c). 
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The reason why God is said to direct everything in nature to-
ward an end ~s that God is the Creator of every good in nature,66 
both the good that a creature has in his substantial being and the 
good possessed by the creature by virtue of his relation to other 
creatures and to his final end, the divine essence. 67 Since God, 
then, is an intellectual being, his act of creation must have fol-
lowed a predetermined plan (at least logically prior by nature). 
This plan or ordination of all creatures toward their last end is 
what is called providence. 
Omne enim bonum quod est in rebus, a Deo creatum est, • 
•• In rebus autem invenitur bonum, non solum quantum 
ad substantiam rerum, sed etiam quantum ad ordinem earum 
in finem, et praecipue in finem ultimum, qui est bonitas 
divina, • •• Hoc igitur bonum ordinis in rebus crea-
tis existens, a Deo creatum est. Cum autem Deus sit 
causa rerum per suum intellectum, et sic cuiuslibet sui 
effectus oportet rationem in ipso praeexistere, ••• 
necesse est quod ratio ordinis rerum in finem in mente 
divina praeexistat. Ratio autem ordinandorum in finem, 
proprie providentia est.68 
This universal ordination of all creatures to God, as to their 
last end, by attraction to the highest good is called providence 
and represents the aspect of finality to be found in transcenden-
tal participation. 
Thus it has been seen that in the essential or static order, 
that is, in the order of likeness, transcendental participation 
involves formal causality in God inasmuch as the exemplary form of 
66Ibid., 6, 4 c. 
67Ibid., 21, 4 c. 
68Ibid.~ 22~ 1 c. 
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every created object is contained in the divine mind. In the crea 
ture this involyes formal causality inasmuch as it deals with the 
form to be received. In the existential or dynamic order, partic-
ipation involves efficient and final causality on the part of God. 
In the creature existential participation is concerned with the 
actual reception of the form in the predisposed matter; and it is 
this matter and form that are preserved in existence and directed 
toward their final end by God's final and efficient causality. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE POSITION OF SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS 
ON THE PARTICIPATION OF 
CREATURES IN GOOD 
After the investigation of the nature of the addition made by 
the concept of good to that of being has been made and an examina-
tion of the Thomistic doctrine of participation in general and 
transcendental participation in particular has been completed, a 
study can now be undertaken of St. Thomas' doctrine on participa-
tion in good. 
In the De Veritate St. Thomas inaugurates his treatment of 
participation in good by posing the question: Is everything good 
by the first goodness? After refuting the arguments of some of 
the adversaries who had weird opinions about the type of causality 
exercised by God in the creation of the world,l Thomas proceeds 
to treat Plato's position. Plato and the Platonists, following 
lDavid of Dinant and others held that God is the same as 
prime matter. Thomas denies this on the score of Aristotle's 
teaching that an efficient cause cannot contain within it a mate-
rial cause because these two causes have contrary characters. 
Others, such as the followers of Amalric of BEme, held that God is 
the form of all things. About this position Thomas says, "effici-
ens vero et forma effecti idem sunt specie, in quantum orone agens 
agit sibi simile, sed non idem numero, quia non potest idem esse 
~ faciens et factum" (De ill., 21, 4 c). 
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the Academic's doctrine of subsistent ideas and participation of 
creatures therein, taught that all things are called good by vir-
tue of their participation in the first goodness, which is God. 2 
Thomas rejects this op~nion and one similar to it that was held by 
the Porretans3 because, with Aristotle, Thomas held that there 
were no subsistent ,ideas but that the forms of things were in 
things themselves and not separated from them. Thomas invokes an-
other Aristotelian argument: even granting that there were sub-
sistent ideas, Plato's position would not apply to good because 
good is not predicated univocally; and in cases in which the pred-
icationwas not univocal, Plato did not assign a single idea. 4 
St. Thomas finds one fault with the thinking of the Platonist 
school on this point. It seems to forget that "every agent is 
found to effect something like itself."S Hence, the first good-
ness" which is understood as the effective cause of all good 
things" imprints a likeness of itself upon the things it effects. 
Therefore, every good thing is good by reason of an inherent form 
which is a likeness of the divine gOOdness. The formal causality 
2Thomas used the term Platonici to refer especially to the 
Neoplatonists; these would Include, for example, Plotinus, Proclus, 
and Pseudo-Dionysius. 
3The followers of Gilbert of La PorNfe (died in l20S); SOme 
of the more famous Porretans were Simon de Tournai, Alain de Lille, 
Nicolas d'Amiens, and Raoul Ardent. 
4De Ver., 21, 4 c. 
SIbid., (111,20): "omne agens invenitur sibi simile agere. 1t 
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on the part of Godl which Plato taughtl is saved inasmuch as God 
is the exem~lary cause of all good things. St. Thomas' opinionl 
thenl is a modification of Plato's. 
Unde si prima bonitas sit effectiva omnium bonoruml 
oportet quodsimilitudinem suam imprimat in rebus effec-
tis; et sic unumquodque dicetur bonum sicut forma in-
haerente per similitudinem summi boni sibi inditaml et 
ulterius per bonitatem primaml sicut per exemplar et 
effectivum omnis" bonitatis creatae. Quantum ad hoc 
opinio Platonis sustineri potest. 
Sic ergo dicimus secundum communem opinioneml quod 
omnia sunt bona bonitate creata formaliter sicut forma 
inhaerente l bonitate vero increata sicut forma exemplari. 6 
St. Thomas went along with Plato in saying that all things were 
good by the first goodness, but Thomas held that the likeness of 
the divine goodness that the creature possessed was had as an in-
herent form and in this way the created good is good by the first 
goodness which is the efficient and exemplary cause of all good 
things. The form of goodness which the creature has is the same 
formality as the goodness of God but it is not possessed according 
to the same nature (that is, substantially or essentially) or in 
the same degree of limitless perfection. Nonetheless l the good-
ness of the creature is a true l if a lesser, likeness of the di-
vine goodness. 
This same doctrine seems to be treated a little more succint-
ly by St. Thomas in the Summa Contra Gentiles. As is customary in 
this work, several proofs are offerred for one proposition. The 
6Ibid. See" also ad 1, where Thomas says that the goodness of 
a creature is drawn out of the divine goodness: ttBonitas crea-
turae extrahitur a divina bonitate." 
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statement that God is the good of every good is proved by argu-
ments based oq God's being all-perfect, and His exemplary and fi-
nal causality. 
The first proof is based upon the fact that God, Who contains 
all the perfections of creatures, must also possess all the good-
ness that creatures have, because the goodness of each thing is 
its perfection and act. 7 "For the goodness of a thing is its per-
fection. • • • Now, since God is simply perfect, He contains in 
His perfection the perfections of all things •••• Therefore 
His goodness contains all goodnesses; and consequently He is the 
good of every good."B God, Who is all-perfect, accordingly pos-
sesses the perfection of every goodness and thus is the good of 
every good. 
The second proof that Thomas gives for the same proposition 
is based on exemplary causality. "A thing is not said to have a 
quality by participation, except in so far as it bears some re-
semblance to that which is said to have that quality essentially: 
thus iron is said to be fiery in so far as it partakes of a re-
semblance to fire. Now, God is good essentially, while 'all else 
is good by participation. • • • Therefore nothing is said to be 
7C.G., I, 37, Amplius: "Bonum uniuscuiusque est actus et 
perfecti~ eius." 
8Ibid., I, 40 (I, 87): "Bonitas enim uniuscuiusque est per-
fectio-rpBius. • •• Deus, autem, cum sit simpliciter perfectus, 
sua perfectione orones rerum perfectiones comprehendit. • Sua 
igitur bonitas orones bonitates comprehendit. Et ita est omnis 
boni bonum." 
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good except in so far as it bears some resemblance to the divine 
goodness. Therefore He is the good of every good. 1I9 Unless there 
is a regress into infinity, which would be repugnant to the notion 
of 'finality,lO there must be a being which is goodness itself and 
which does not possess goodness from another through participation 
but has it by its own essence. This being, known to the human in-
tellect by various names--such as the first cause, the prime mover 
or the greatest good--is the cause of all created goods, among 
which are included logically all goods other than the supreme good 
According to the Thomistic theory of participation, then, any be-
ing possessing some quality through participation, possesses it 
through a likeness of an attribute of the same kind had by a being 
that possesses it by virtue of its essence. And if a creature 
possesses goodness, it does so through a likeness of the divine 
goodness. II[N] othing is said to be good except in so far as it 
beara some resemblance to the divine goodness." ll Thus does God 
exercise the function of exemplary causality toward the creature 
that participates in His goodness. 
9Ibid.: "Quod per participationem dicitur aliquale, non di-
citur tare-nisi inquantum habet quandam similitudinem eius quod 
per ~ssentiam dicitur: sicut ferrum dicitur ignitum inquantum 
quandam similitudinem ignis participat. Sed Deua eat bonus per 
essentiam, omnis vero alia per participationem. • •• Igitur ni-
hil dicetur bonum nisi inquantum habet aliquam similitudinem di-
vinae bonitatis. .liat igitur ipse bonum omnis boni." 
10Ibid., I, 37. 
llIbid., I, 40: "Igitur nihil dicetur bonum nisi inquantum 
habet aliquam similitudinem divinae bonitatis." 
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The third and last proof given in the Summa Contra Gentiles 
that God is tbe good of every good is taken from God's finality 
and the nature of goodness itself~ "Since a thing is desirable 
for the sake of an end, and the aspect of good consists in its be-
ing desirable; it follows that a thing is said to be good, either 
because it is an end, or because it is directed to an end. There-
fore the last end is that from which all things take the aspect of 
good. Now this is God. • • • Therefore God is the good of every 
good. h12 Since good is that toward which there is an appetititive 
tendency and every .end toward which a being tends is a real or an 
apparent good or something leading to such a good, the notions of 
good and end are inseparable. 13 The ultimate end of all creatures 
is that to which all beings are ordained and from which all inter-
mediate ends receive the notion of finality. That God is the fi-
nal end of all creatures is proved in the third book of the Summa 
Contra Gentiles. 14 
All creatures, then, participating in God's goodness through 
a likeness of the divine goodness, participate also in the notion 
of finality, which is found in its highest and ultimate perfection 
l2Ibid., (I, 86-87): "Cum unumquodque appetibile sit propter 
finem; boni autem ratio consistat in hoc quod est appetibile: 0-
portet quod unumquodque dicatur bonum vel quia est finis, vel quia 
ordinatur ad finem. Finis igitur ultimus est a quo omnia rationem 
boni accipiunt. Hoc autem Deus est. • •• Est igitur Deus omnis 
boni bonum. It 
21, 
l3This was discussed in 
2 Cj and S.T., 5, 3 c. 
l4 Ibid ., C. 17. 
Chapter I, pp. 14-16; see also De Ver., 
---
;, 
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in God's goodness. Moreover, any being seeking a creature as its 
end, seeks it only inasmuch as it participates in the notion of 
finality found in God and inasmuch as the creature is ordained to 
the divine goodness. For St. Thomas says: uln all mutually sub-
ordinate ends the last must needs be the end of each preceding 
end: thus if a potion be mixed to be given to a sick man; and is 
given to him that he may be purged; and he be purged that he may 
be lowered, and lowered that he may be healed, it follows that 
health is the end of the lowering, and of the purging, and of 
those that precede. Now all things are subordinate in various de-
grees of goodness to the one supreme good, that is the cause of 
all goodness: and so, since good has the aspect of an end, all 
things are subordinate to God as preceding ends under the last 
end. 'l'herefore God must be the end of all. u15 Thus, just as in 
curing a patient the doctor uses several remedies to obtain the 
desired end, which is the health of the patient, so in creation 
the various degrees in the hierarchy of goods are all directed to-
ward the greatest good, which is the cause of every good. 
There is this difference, however, between the example just 
l5C.G., III, 17 (III, 34): "In ommibus finibus ordinatis 0-
portet quod ultimus finis sit finis omnium praecedentium finium: 
sicut, si potio conficitur ut detur aegroto, datur autem ut purge-
tur, purgatur autem ut extenuetur, extenuatur autem ut sanetur; 
oportet quod sanitas sit finis et extenuationis et purgationis et 
aliorum praecedentium. Sed omnia inveniuntur in diversis gradibus 
bonitatis ordinata sub uno summo bono, quod est causa omnis boni-
tatis: ac per hoc, cum bonum habeat rationem finis, omnia ordi-
nantur sub Deo sicut fines praecedentes sub fine ultimo." This 
passage also shows the quaint medical practices of the thirteenth 
centur • 
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given from the Contra. Gentiles and the doctrine intended. The 
means the doctor uses are not goods in themselves, except useful 
goods; while many goods in the transcendental hierarchy of good 
could be real goods. The castor oil which the doctor might use to 
cure a patient is not an end in itself, and thus it is neither an 
honorable good nor by any stretch of the imagination is it a 
pleasurable good; but it is a useful good. But a servant of God 
could take a vacation in order to serve God better. The vacation 
would be a pleasurable good, something desired in itself and thus 
having the true idea of an end; but it would be directed at the 
same time to a greater good, the service of God. In this way all 
the genuine goods are ordained to the divine goodness, the cause 
of every good. 
It has been seen, then, that God is the cause of every good 
in creatures; for all creatures share or participate in the good-
ness of God through a likeness of the divine goodness which the 
creatures receive as inherent forms and constituent principles. 
It is the form of goodness which gives the creature the notion of 
finality and makes of it a true end. The actualization of this 
form is accomplished by God's efficient causality in His operation 
of creation and conservation. "Everything is therefore called 
good from the divine goodness, as from the first exemplary, effec-
tive and final principle of all goodness. Nevertheless, every-
thing is called good by reason of the likeness of the divine good-
ness belonging to it, which is formally its own goodness, whereby 
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it is denominated good." 16 This passage from the Summa Theologiae 
gives the same position about a creature's possession of good that 
is found in the De Veritate: 17 although the divine goodness is 
the exemplary, efficient, and final cause of all goodness in crea-
tures, the creature still possesses its likeness of the divine 
goodness as a form that inheres in the creature's essential con-
stitution. 
A further point to be noted about good is that it is perfec-
tive according to its act of existence as well as its specific 
character.18 A creature's act of existence is provided for by God' f 
efficient causality; the specific character, by God's exemplary 
causality; but the species or nature is actuated by efficient cau-
sality, and both the specific character and its existence are di-
rected to God by His final causality. II [A]ir is said to be bright 
from the sun, not because the very fact that the air is referred 
to the sun is the brightness of the air, but because the placing 
of the air directly before the sun is the cause of its being 
bright. It is in this way that the creature is called good with 
reference to God." 19 Just as the light of the sun causes light in 
16S •T., I, 6, 4 c (I, 55): "Sic ergo unumquodque dicitur bo-
num bonTtate divina, sicut primo principio exemplar1, effectivo et 
finali totius bonitatis. Nihilom1nus tamen unumquodque dicitur 
bonum sim11itud1ne divinae bonitatis sibi inhaerente, quae est 
formaliter sua bonitas denomlnans ipsum." 
172:1, 4 c. 
18De Ver., 22, 1, ad 1. 
19Ibid .-".. 21. 4. ad 2 (III. 20-21): tla_er dicatur lucen8 a 80-
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the air, so does the divine goodness cause goodness in the crea~ 
ture, giving i~ the formality of goodness, the actual existence of 
the formality of goodness; and in its formality the creature re-
ceives tile direction of its goodness to the greatest good through 
God's efficient causality. 
This causal relation between creature and Creator indicates 
the dependence of the creature on the Creator for the constituent 
principles of its make-up, not only for its being called into be-
ing but also for its preservation in existence. As was indicated 
above,20 St. Thomas seems to mention participation explicitly on-
ly in connection with God's exemplary causality, inasmuch as crea-
tures participate in the divine essence by a likeness of that es-
sence which is their form. This exemplary causality, however, at 
the least presupposes efficient and final causality; for the form 
would be of no avail if it were not actuated in some matter, nor 
would the agent act if it did not have some reason or end in mind. 
Therefore, the actualization and ordering of the exemplary causal-
ity involved in the part played by God in participation depends 
upon His efficient and final causality. 
Moreover, in certain passages from the writings of st. Thomas 
le: non quod ipsum referri aerem ad solem sit lucere aeris, sed 
quia directa oppositio aeris ad solem est causa quod luceat. Et. 
hoc modo creatura dicitur bona per respectum ad bonum.1t The con-
text here, where Thomas is explaining how creatures can have good-
ness from God, makes it clear that bonum in this passage refers to 
God, the Summum Bonum. 
20Chapter II, pp. 49-51. 
. j 
! 
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he almost says that efficient and exemplary causality are a part 
of the role played by God in the participation of creatures in His 
goodness. In the De Veri tate Thomas says that the likeness by 
which the creature shares in the goodness of God is imprinted on 
the creature by God's efficient causality. "If ••• the first 
goodness is the effective cause of all goods, it must imprint its 
likeness upon the things produced~·1f2l From the context here it is 
seen that St. Thomas held that the first good was the cause of all 
other goods, and he states that this comes about by impressing a 
likeness of the first goodness upon the creature, which seems to 
denote the operation of efficient causality. 
In the passage from the S~ Theologiae where Thomas proves 
that the first goodness is the cause of all other goodness, effici-
ent causality is put on a par with exemplary and final causality. 
"Everything is therefore called good from the divine goodness, as 
from the first exemplary, effective and final principle of all 
goodness.,,22 Here Thomas mentions all three causes in the same 
[breath. 
It is true that causality is not participation. Participa-
tion by its very nature connotes limitation, passivity, and recep-
tion of something from some extrinsic source. The causality of 
21De Ver. 21, 4 c (III, 20): "8i prima bonitas sit effectiva 
--' omnium bonorum, oportet quod similitudinem imprimat in rebus ef-
~ectis." 
22S.T., I, 6, 4 C (I, 55): "Unumquodque dicitur bonum boni-
tate divina, sicut primo principio exemplari, effectivo et finali 
Itotius boni taU s. " 
,: 
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God, however, is what makes participation possible. 23 The divine 
causality is the role that God plays in participation. All of the 
causes are needed to make participation work. Why restrict partic 
ipation to exemplary causality? 
But in spite of the arguments for making efficient and final 
causality a part of the system of participation, there seems to be 
no text of St. Thomas' writings that explicity states this doc-
trine. In a characteristic statement of Aquinas on participation 
it is likeness or similitude that is highlighted. The following 
is one such typical passage: itA thing is not said to have a qual-
ity by participation, except in so far as it bears SOme resemblanc 
to that which is said to have that quality essentially."24 The 
likeness of the divine goodness that the creature possesses is wha 
entitles the creature to be called good. 
Perhaps it could be said that participation is had principall 
through exemplary causality and secondarily through final and ef-
ficient causality. It cannot be said, however, that St. Thomas 
taught such a hierarchy of causality in the matter of participa-
tion, because there is no text that would bear out such an opinion. 
After realizing that God is the total cause of goodness in 
creatures, one might ask, "Why did God wish to share His goodness 
23See pages 50-51 and note 51 for texts and references to te 
texts showing connection between participation and causality. 
24C•G., I, 40 (I, 86): "Quod per participationem dicitur ali 
quale, non dicitur tale nisi inquantum habet quandam similitudinem 
eius quod per essentiam dicitur." 
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with others?" ItBecause He is so good," st. Thomas answers. ItGod 
is infinitely good: for which reason He admits His creatures to a 
participation of good thingS.n2~It is God's infinite goodness that 
prompts Him to share His goodness with creatures. His complete 
goodness needs nothing else, but it motivates Him to share it with 
creatures. 
Many texts testify to the fact that Aquinas believed that God 
poured forth His goodness upon creatures freely. In the De Veri-
tate he quotes Pseudo-Dionysius as saying, "the divine goodness 
communicates itself to us like the sun, which, without previous 
choice or knowledge, pours out its rays upon all bodies.,,26 In 
another place Aquinas says that it is in the, communication of good 
in general that God does no picking or choosing, but in the commun-
ication of this or that good there is some question of choice. "If 
2:5S•T., III, 23, 1 c (D.T., 11,2147 a):. ItDeus. ; • est in-
finitae-bonitatis: ex qua contingit quod ad participationem bono-
rum suas creaturas admittit." In another place St. Thomas says 
the same thing: "Ad productionem creaturarum nihil aliud movet 
Deum nisi sua bonitas, quam rebus aliis communicare voluit secun-
dum modum assimilationis ad ipsum." This last citation is from 
the Contra Gentiles, II, 46. 
26 Pseudo~Dionysius, De Divinis Nominibus, c. 4; PG 3, 694; as 
quoted by St. Thomas, De Ve"ritate, 5, 2, argo 1 (I, 207): "divina 
bonitas se creaturis communicat sicut noster sol, non f.raeeligens 
neque praecognoscens, radio suos in corpora diffundit.' St. Thom-
as explains this dictum of Dionysius 1n the same article, ad 1: 
"Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod similitudo Dionysii quantum ad hoc 
attenditur, quod sicut sol nullum corpus excludit, quantum in se 
est, a sui luminis communicationej ita etiam nec divina bonitas 
aliquam creaturam a sui participatione." In S.T., I, 19, 4, ad 1 
and De Ver., 23, 1, ad 1 Thomas makes the same comment on the same 
passage of Dionysiusj this doctrine is also set forth in S.T., I, 
23, 4, ad 1, while in I, 21, 4 c and C.G., II, 28 Thomas says that 
God .La more generous than the situation demands. 
the communication of the divine goodness in general be considered l 
God communicates His goodness without election l inasmuch as there 
is nothing which does not in some way share in His goodness •••• 
But if we consider the communication of this or that particular 
good l He does not allot it without election; since He gives certai 
goods to some men, which He does not give to others.,,27 So it is 
that the divine goodness is manifested in creatures, by God's gi-
ving one what the other does not receive and sharing with another 
some aspect of the divine essence not imparted to the first. Every 
creature, however, gets something and in this respect God refuses 
no creature His goodness. 
The communication of the divine goodness through a diversity 
of creatures is admirably explained in the Summa Contra Gentiles. 
Deus per suam providentiam omnia ordinat in divinam boni-
tatem sicut in finem: non autem hoc modo quod suae boni-
tati aliquid per ea quae fiunt accrescat, sed ut simili-
tudo suae bonitatis, quantum possibile est, imprimatur 
in rebus. Quia vero omnem creatam substnntiam a perfec-
tione divinae bonitatis deficere necesse est, ut perfec-
tius divinae bonitntis similitudo rebus communicaretur, 
oportuit esse diversitatem in rebus, ut quod perfecte ab 
uno repraesentari non potest, per diversa diversimode 
perfectiori modo repraesentaretur: nam et homo, cum 
mentis conceptum uno vocali verbo videt sufficienter ex-
primi non posse, verba diversimode multiplicat ad expri-
mendam per diversa suae mentis conceptionem. Et in hoc 
etiam divinae perfectionis eminentia conaiderari potest, 
quod perfecta bonitas, quae in Deo est unite et simpli-
citer, in creaturis esse non potest nisi secundum modum 
27S•T., I, 23, 4, ad 1 (I, 244): "Si consideratur communica-
tio bonitatis divinae in communi, absque electione bonitatem suam' 
communicat; inquantum scilicet nihil est, quod non participet ali-
quid de bonitate eius. • •• Sed si consideretur communicatio 
istius vel illius boni l non absque electione tribuit: quia quae-
dam bona dat ali uibus uae non dat aliis." 
, 
c 
. ;, 
diversum et per plura. Res autem per hoc diversae sunt, 
quod formas habent diversas, a quibus speciem sortiuntur. 
Sic igitur ex fine sumitur ratio diversitatis formarum 
in rebus. 28 . 
'Ii!. 
Diversity among creatures is had, then, so that the various as-
pects of the divine goodness may be portrayed better. Since no 
one of the participants in the divine essence can manifest all of 
its perfections, the divine goodness is better known through the 
diversity of creatures found in creation. 
Although St. Thomas says, "The divine goodness keeps no crea-
ture from participating in itself,"29 in other places he affirms 
that creatures can limit the amount of the divine essence they 
.are capable of receiving. "Good c ommunica te s itself. It belongs 
to the highest good, therefore, to communicate itself in the high-
est possible degree, that is, as much as each and everything is 
capable of receiving it. Consequently, if it does not communicate 
itself to something, this is because that thing is not capable of 
28C.G., III, 97. In De Ver., 5, 8, argo 9, Thomas quotes 
Pseudo-Dionysius (accord~ng-to Spiazzi, Quaestiones Disputatae, I, 
102 a; but no further reference is given) on the same subject: 
"Magis autem manifestatur divina bonitas, ut dicit Dionysius, in 
diversitate naturarum quam in numerositate eorum quae eandem natu-
ram habent; et propter hoc etiam non facit omnes creaturas ratio-
nales vel per se existentes, sed quasdam rationales, et quasdam 
per se existentes, et alias existentes in alio, sicut accidentia." 
The Leonine edition, as\translated into English, attributes the say .. 
ing to St. Augustine of Hippo (Truth, I, p. 230); and this idea is 
found in three places in the writings of Augustine: Contra adver-
sarium legis et prophetarum, I, 4, PL 42, 606-607; De genesi contrs 
Manicheos, I, 21, PL 34, 188-189; and Octoginta Trium Quaestionum, 
XLI, PL 40, 27. 
29De Ver., 5, 2, ad 1 (I, 210): "nec divina bonitas a1iquam 
creaturam a sui participatione exc1udit." 
. . 
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eceiving it. n30 Thomas, however, gives an answer to this diffi-
culty of how the divine goodness can communicate itself freely and 
t the same time give more to one than to the other. nIt belongs 
o the divine goodness as infinite to give from its perfections 
hatever the nature of each thing requires and is capable of re-
ceiving.,,3l The key to the problem here is nature. A certain na-
ture or essence can take only a limited amount of perfection. 
Therefore, although God communicates to this nature as freely as 
e does to others, still this being will receive less of the di-
vine perfection because it is so limited by its nature, which in-
cludes the limiting principle as well as the specific or charac-
teristic perfection. Because of other circumstances, free will, 
for example, in human beings, the amount of perfection one individ-
al will receive is different from what another will participate. 
Aquinas says that good (and God is the greatest good) is even 
extended to non-beings. "Good extends to non-beings • • • causall 
inasmuch as non-beings tend to good. And so we can call non-beings 
things which are in potency and not in act."32. Inasmuch as non-
30Ibid., 6, 2, argo 6 (I, 261): "Bonum est communicativum aui 
ipsius.~go summi boni est summe se communicare, secundum quod 
numquodque est capax. 8i ergo alicui non se communicat, hoc est 
quia non est'capax ejus." 
31Ibid., ad 6 (I, 266): "Quod ad bonitatem divinam pertinet, 
in quanrum-est infinita, ut de perfectionibus quas unaquaeque res 
secundum 9uam naturam requirit, unicuique largiatur, secundum quod 
est ejus capax. 1i The underscoring is in neither text. 
32De Ver., 21, 2, ad 2 (III, 11): "Bonum ••• se extendit a 
non entia :-7 . per causalitatem, inquantum non entia appetunt 
dica us non entia ea uae sunt in otentia et non in 
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beings tend toward good, the goodness of God extends toward them 
by final causality. Elsewhere St. Thomas says that in this re-
spect the notion of good is more extensive than that of being; for, 
when non-beings tend toward being, they tend toward it as a good, 
and only good things seek good. 33 
After the consideration of the part God plays in participa-
tion, that is, His role as the First Cause according to the effici-
ent, final, and exemplary modes of causality, there remains to be 
seen the manner in which creatures participate in the greatest 
good, which is the divine goodness. 
As has been seen, Aquinas tells us that creatures participate 
in the divine goodness by a likeness of that goodness. Inasmuch 
as a creature possesses the nature of goodness, to that extent is 
it like the divine goodness. 34 The goodness which the creature has 
is a likeness of the goodness of God--not an exact image of the 
divine essence because such cannot be except in God, but a likeness 
of some facet of the divine goodness. 35 
To this doctrine of a creature's goodness through participa-
tion in the divine goodness st. Thomas adds a logical corollary: 
the more closely a created substance resembles the divine goodness, 
jactu. 1t 
33C.G., III, 20. 
3 . 4C•G., III, 64: uRes autem participant divinam bonitatem 
lPer modum-similitudinis, inquantum ipsae suntbonae." 
35 Thomas says the same thing in S.T., I, 44, 4, ad 3; 105, 5 c~ 
II-II, 23, 2, ad 1; C.G, I, '96; III, 24: 
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the more it participates in goodness. 36 As a reason for this Thorn 
aa says that the closer a being approximates its cause the more it 
shares in the effect of that.cause. 37 It is necessary to under-
stand cause in the sense of exemplary cause. The more a creature 
is like the divine goodness the more it shares in that goodness. 
Aquinas tells us, moreover, .that it is the intellectual crea-
tures who most approximate God; for they come closest to God, Who 
is a knowing and willing being. "Now, among the superior crea-
tures, the closest to God are those rational ones that exist, live, 
and understand in the likeness of God. Consequently, God in His 
goodness gives them the power not only of pouring out upon other 
things but also of having the same manner of outpouring that He 
Himself has--that is, according to their will, and not according 
to any necessity of their nature."38 Man, because he is endowed 
with free choice and understanding, more closely approximates the 
divine essence than any other creature having matter in its essen-
tial make-up; for no other creature on earth has these divine 
qualities. In the Summa Contra Gentiles Thomas says the same 
36De Ver., 29, 5 c: "Unaquaeque autem substantia tanto a Deo 
pleniuslbonitatem ejus participat, quanto ad ejus bonitatem appro-
pinquat." 
37C .G., III, 64, Item 2: "Quanto aliquid propinquius est 
causae,-tanto plus participat de effectu ipsius." 
38De Ver., 5, 8 c: "Inter superiores autem creaturas maxime 
propinquae-sllnt Deo cre~turae rationales, quae ad Dei similitudi-
nem sunt, vivunt, et intelligunt; unde eis non solum a divina bo-
nitate confertur ut super alia influant, sed etlam ut eundem modum 
influendi retineant quo influit Deus; scilicet per voluntatem, et 
non er necessitatem naturae." (I 233.) 
I
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thing in substance but not quite so explicitly, for he is talking 
of why it is fitting that there should be intellectual creatures. 
Similitudo autem unius invenitur in altero dupliciter: 
uno modo, quantum ad esse naturae, sicut similitudo ca-
loris ignei est in re calefacta per ignem; alio modo, 
secundum cognitionem, sicut similitudo ignis est in vi-
su vel tactu. Ad hoc igitur quod similitudo Dei per-
fecte esset in rebus modis possibilibus, oportuit quod 
divina bonitas rebus per similitudinem communicaretur 
non solum in essendo, sed cognoscendo. Cognoscere autem 
divinam bonitatem solus intellectus potest. Oportuit 
igitur esse creaturas intellectuales. 39 
superiority of intellectual creatures is shown here by the fac 
t these can possess a likeness of God not only in their act of 
xistence according to their nature but also in knowing and under-
standing the goodness of the divinity according to their nature. 
God also employs the higher creatures to communicate His good 
ess to the creatures that participate the least in the divine 
goodness by allowing the higher creatures to exercise a certain 
amount of causality toward the lower beings. "Similarly, in the. 
ordering of the universe, as a result of the outpouring of God's 
goodness, superior creatures have not only that by which they are 
oodn in themselves, but also that by which they are the cause of 
oodness for other things which participate the least in God's 
oodness."40 Elsewhere in the De Veri tate St. Thomas affirms that 
39C.G., II, 46, Item. 
40De Ver., 5, 8 c (I, 233): "Unde et in ordine universi cre-
turae supeFrores ex influentia divinae bonitatis habent non solum 
od in seipsis bonae sint; sed etiam quod sint causae bonitatis 
liorum1 quae extremum modum participationis divinae bonitatis bent.lt 
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this communication of good to other creatures is the most noble 
imitation of the divine goodness. 41 A creature's imitation of God 
. 
is most noble, then, when the creature imitates God's way of shar-
ing His goodness with others. 
Now, after the consideration of the degrees of participation 
in the divine goodness, an investigation can be made into the ways 
in which a creature participates in the divine goodness. St. Thorn 
as tells us that two aspects of a creature can be considered in 
this regard: (1) the species taken absolutely, and (2) the rela-
tion of the creature to its end. 42 Thomas states, furthermore, 
that good is present in things according to both their substance 
. and their ordination toward their end •. 43 In this study the crea-
ture's participation in good according to its substance will be 
considered first. 
This brings up a problem proposed to Boethius (A.D. 470-526) 
that he endeavored to answer in a work often referred to as De 
Hebdomadibus but more correctly entitled Quomodo Substantiae Bonae 
Sint. The problem is proposed in the form of a dilemma consider-
419, 2 c: "Ex bonitate divina procedit quod ipse de perfec-
tione sua creaturis communicet secundum earum proportionemj et 
ideo non solum intantum communicat eis de sua bonitate, quod in se 
sint bona et perfecta, sed etiam ut aliis perfectionem largiantur, 
Deo quoddammodo cooperantej et hic est nobilissimus modus divinae 
imitationis.tI 
42De Ver., 5, 1, ad 1: "In re creata cuo possunt considerari 
scilicetspecies ejus absolute, et ordo ejus ad finem." 
43S•T., I, 22, 1 c: "In rebus autem invenitur bonum, non so-
lum quantum ad substantiam rerum, sed etiam quantum ad ordinem 
i e et raeci ue finem ultimum." 
, , 
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ing the arguments for and against saying that creatures are good 
substantially. If creatures are good substantially, they seem to 
be identified with God ( or good in the same way as God) and this 
would lead to pantheism; if creatures are good by participation, 
it would seem that goodness is a mere accident consequent upon sub-
stance. Boethius wrested with the problem, and St. Thomas ex-
plained Boethius' solution in his In Librum Boetii De Hebdomadibus 
Expositio. 44 How well Thomas interpreted Boethius will not be 
considered here; only the doctrine presented in the commentary is 
to the purpose. 
In the third Lectio of the Commentary 2£ the De Hebdomadibus 
St. Thomas gets down to the problem itself. First he states it in 
its simplest terms: Are beings good by their essences or by parti-
cipation?45 Thomas then points out that in this question it is 
presupposed that to be by one's own substance and to be through 
participation are direct OPPosites. 46 Next it is granted by Thom-
as that according to one of the types of participation, that by 
which a subject participates in an accident or matter participates 
in a form, this possession of a perfection by essence and through 
participation would be directly opposed. Because the form of the 
44Ed. M. Calcaterra, O.P., in s. Thomae Aquinatis Opuscula 
Theologica (Turin, 1954), II, 391-408. 
45In de Rebd., lect. 3, n. 43: "Est ergo quaestio utrum 
entia sintbona per essentiam, vel per participationem." 
46Ibid ., n. 44: "Ad intel1ectum huius quaestionis consideran-
dum est, quod in istaquaestione praesupponitur quod aliquid esse 
InA)'> essentlam et~er participationem slnt opposlta." 
accident is not contained within the nature, and the perfection of 
a substantial form is not present in the uninformed matter, these 
perfections cannot be predicated of their subjects in an essential 
sense. 47 
St. Thomas goes on to say, however, that in that type of par-
ticipation in which species participates genus, there is true par-
ticipation and at the same time the predication is substantial. 
"But in the second mode of participation, namely that by which spe 
cies participates in genus, it is true that the species partici-
pates in the genus. This is also true in the opinion of Plato, 
who held that the idea of animal was distinct from the idea of a 
two-footed man. But in the opinion of Aristotle, who held that 
man actually is that which animal is (on the grounds that the es-
sence of animal does not exist without the specific difference of 
man), nothing stands in the way of the substantial predication of 
something that is said to exist through participation. u48 If good 
ere predicated of creatures in this way, they would participate 
47Ibid ., IIEt in uno quidem supradictorum participationis mo-
orum manifeste verum est: scilicet secundum illum modum quo sub-
iectum dicitur participare accidens, vel materia formam. Est enim 
ccldens praeter naturam subiecti, et f'orma praeter ipsam subs tan-
tiam materiae. lt 
48Ibid ., n. 45: USed in alio participationis modo, quo sci-
licet species participat genus, hoc verum est quod species parti-
cipat genus. Boc etiam verum est secundum sententiam Platonis, 
qui posuit aliam esse ideam animalis, et bipedinis hominis. Sed 
secundum sententiam Aristotelis, qui posuit quod homo vere est id 
quod est animal, quasi essentia animalis non existente praeter 
differentiam hominis; nihil prohibet, id quod per participationem 
dici tur, substantiali ter praedicari. II 
tiU 
in goodness and at the same time possess it substantially, just as 
man possesses the perfections of the notion of animal substantial-
lye 
But Boethius takes participation to mean possess as an acci-
dent in the sense that man would participate in the accident of 
whiteness. Therefore, it would necessarily follow that if crea-
tures are good by participation, they would not be good in them-
selves. 49 If it were true, then, that things are not good substan 
tially, it would follow that they would not tend toward good; but 
Boethius has already granted that creatures tend toward gOOd. 50 
The other horn of the dilemma leads to the conclusion that if 
creatures were substantial goods they would also be substantial 
existences and thus they would be the first good, which is God. 51 
Thomas gives the solution to this problem by saying that God, 
the first good, has goodness of His own proper nature, which is 
goodness itself. Creatures do not have goodness by their nature 
or essence, which is that of humanity or some such thing; but they 
are good by virtue of the relationship of causality they have to 
49Ibid., n. 47: "Sieut igitur Boetius hie accipit participa-
tionem, prout subiectum participat accidens; per se autem quod po-
niturOin definitione subiecti. Et sic ex necessitate sequitur 
quod si res sint bonae per participationem, quod non sint bonae 
per se." 
50Ibid. 
51Ibid., nne 48-51; in paragraph # 52 St. Thomas says: "Si 
ergo omnia sunt ipsum primum bonum; cum ipsum primum bonum nihil 
aliud sit quam Deus, sequitur quod omnia entia sunt Deus: quod 
nefas est." 
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the first good, their first principle and last end. 
Esse primi boni est secundum propriam rationem bonum, 
quia natura et essentia primi boni nihil aliud est quam 
bonitasj esse autem secundi boni est quidem bon~~, non 
secundum rationem propriae essentiae, quia essentia 
eius non est ipsa bonitas, sed vel humanitas, vel ali-
quid aliud huiusmodij sed esse eius habet quod sit bonum 
ex habitudine ad primum bonum, quod est eius causa: ad 
quod quidem comparatur sicut ad primum principium et ul-
timum finem; per modum quo aliquid dicitur sanum, quo 
aliquid ordinatur ad finem sanitatisj ut dicitur medi-
cinale secundum quod est a principio effectivo artis me-
dicinae. 52 
The participation which creatures enjoy in the divine goodness, 
then, is the third type enumerated by St. Thomas in a preceding 
lectio of the In Boetii De Hebdomadibus. 53 This is the participa-
tion of effect in its cause. As God is the cause of goodness in 
creatures, so the creature partiCipates through this causality in 
the divine goodness. 
It still remains to examine just how this goodness is present 
in creatures. St. Thomas tells us that it is present in the form 
or essence, in the existence,. and in the accidents of creatures. 
Goodness in a creature according to form and existence is called 
the substantial goodness of the creature or goodness in a quali-
fied sense, while the goodness present by virtue of the accidents 
is known as absolute goodness. itA creature is from God not only 
in its essence but also in its act of existing, which constitutes 
52 Ibid ., lect. 4, n. 62. 
53Lect • 2. The original Latin text is given above on page 29 
of this study. This third type of participation, of course, is 
the transcendental, cited above on page 32 and discussed on pages 
41 and followln • 
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the chief characteristic of substantial goodnessj and also in its 
additional perfections, which constitute its absolute goodness. 
These are not the "essence of the thing. And furthermore, even the 
relation by which the essence of the thing is referred to God as 
its source is distinct from the easence."54 
It seems rather surprising that the absolute goodness of a 
creature is due to its accidental goodness. As Thomas himself re-
marks, it is the other way around with existencej and one would 
expect it to be the same with goodness. 55 As will be seen, the 
reason for mants principal good being from his accidents is that 
good is relative. 
First of all, as has been said, goodness is present in the 
creature according to form. As already has been seen above,56 
goodness is present in the creature in the inherent form which is 
a likeness, the exemplary idea of which is contained in the divine 
intellect as a possible participation in the divine goodness. 57 
Secondly, goodness is present in the creature according to 
54De Ver., 21, 5, ad 5 .(III, 27): "Creatura non solum est a 
o secundum essentiam suam, sed secundum esse suum, in quo prae-
cipue consistit ratio bonitatis substantialiSj et secundum perfec-
tiones superadditas, in quibus consistit bonitas absoluta; et haec 
non sunt essentia rei. Et praeterea ipse respectus quo essentia 
rei refertur ad Deum ut ad principium, est aliud quam essentia." 
55Ibid., 5 c: "De bono autem est e converso. Nam secundum 
substantraIem bonitatem dicitur aliquld bonum secundum ~uidj sec 
vero acc dentale dicitur allquid bonum simpliciter. 
56pp. 59, 60, & 65. 
57De Ver., 21, 4 c; S.T., I, 6, 4 c. 
its act of existence. 58 As has already been pointed out, St. 
as held that in the act of existence a creature's substantial 
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ss is chiefly had. "A creature is from God ••• in its act of 
existing, which constitutes the chief characteristic of substan-
tial goodness. u59 This is most reasonable, for being and good are 
interchangeable, and accordingly the act of being must be good in 
itself. Moreover, the act of being is a likeness of the divine 
goodness, which is being itself. 
This substantial goodness, however, is called qualified good-
ness, or goodness in a certain sense. The unqualified goodness or 
absolute goodness that a creature has is his accidental goodness. 
"From the point of view of its substantial goodness a thing is 
said to be good in a certain sense, but from that of its acciden-
tal goodness it is said to be good without qualification. Thus we 
do not call an unjust man good simply, but only in a certain sense 
inasmuch as he is a man. But a just man we call good without fur-
ther restriction. u60 This brings up the subject of accidental 
58It should be noted that in the Thomistic metaphysics, form 
is distinct from existence. As Thomas puts it in the Compendium 
Theologiae, "F'orma consequi tur esse, etai etiam non sit ipsum esse " 
I, 111; ed. Verardo, S. Thomae Aquinatis Opuscula Theologica, I, • 
59De Ver., 21, 5, ad 5 (III, 27): "Creatura ••• est a Deo 
••• secundum esse suum in quo praecipue consistit ratio bonitati 
substantialis. 1t 
60Ibid., c (III, 25): "Nam secundum Bubstantialem bonitatem 
dicitur-aIrquid bonum secundum quid, secundum vero accidentalem 
dicitur aliquid bonum simpliciter; unde hominem injustum non di-
cimus bonum simpliciter, sed secundum quid, in quantum est homo; 
hominem vero justum dicimus simpliciter bonum." 
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good in man and his ordination to God the Creator. 
The reason why a creature is not called good in an absolute 
. 
sense except by virtue of his accidental perfections is that good-
ness is had with respect to others and a creature is in perfect 
harmony with other things through accidents. For the creature's 
operations are had by means of powers distinct from the essence. 6l 
A creature's perfection, then, is attained through the operation 
of its powers by which accidental perfections accrue to the indiv-
idual. The absolute perfection of the creature is had through the 
accidents and not the essence or nature. 62 
The creature in both its constituent and accidental princi-
ples is directed to God as to its last end. "Now things are di-
rected to the ultimate end intended by God, the divine goodness to 
wit, not only in that they operate, but also in the very fact that 
they exist: because inasmuch as they exist they bear a likeness 
to the divine goodness, which is the end of all things."63 All 
61Ibid ., "Nam unumquodque dicitur esse ens in quantum absolu-
te consideratur; bonum vero ••• secundum respectum ad alia. In 
seipso autem aliquid perficitur ut sUbsistat per essentialia prin-
cipia; sed ut debito modo se habeat ad omnia quae sunt extra ipsum, 
on perficitur nisi mediantibus accidentibus superadditis essentiae 
quia operationes quibus unum alteri conjungitur ab essentia median-
tibus virtutibus essentiae superadditis progrediuntur." 
62Ibid ., ad 5. 
63C•G., III, 65 (III, 155): "In finem autem ultimum quem Deus 
intendit,-scilicet bonitatem·divinam, ordinantur res non solum per 
oc quod operantur, sed etiam per hoc quod sunt; quia inquantum 
sunt, divinae bonitatis similitudinem gerunt, quod est finis 
rerum. II This citation is from the beginning of this rather length-
ly article; in the Leonine manual edition it is found on page 297b. 
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creatures, both inasmuch as they are and inasmuch as they operate 
through powers distinct from their sUbstantial existences, tend to 
become like or to be assimilated to the divine goodness. Two pas-
sages from the Summa Contra Gentiles illustrate this point. 
Praeterea. Res orones creatae sunt quaedam imagines 
primi agentis, scilicet Del: agens enim agit sibi simi-
le. Perfectio autem imaginis est ut repraesentet auum 
exemplar per similitudinem ad ipsum: ad hoc enim imago 
constltuitur. Sunt igitur res Omnes propter divinam 
similitudinem consequendam sicut propter ultimum finem. 
Adhuc. Omnis res per suum motum vel actionem ten-
dit in aliquod bonum sicut in finem. • •• In tanturo 
autem aliquid de bono participat, in quantum assimila-
.tur primae bonitati, quae Deus est. Omnia igitur per 
motus suos et actionem tendunt in divinam similitudinem 
sicut in finem ultimum. 64 
Thus, it is not only proper to a creature to be a likeness of the 
divine goodness, but also, inasmuch as it is possible, to become 
more like God, the infinite good. 
This attraction of all things to the divine goodness extends 
even to prime matter, according to Aquinas. Good that is predica-
ted of prime matter is not to be called merely potential good; but 
inasmuch as it is ordained to good can the matter be called good 
(by the very fact of that ordination). Another reason for saying 
that prime matter can be called good is that prime matter has a 
tendency to~ard being and therefore toward good. Because only 
lilre things seek like things, the prime matter must be Bood. 
Et licet unumquodque sit bonum inquantum est ens, non 
tamen oportet quod materia, quae est ens solum in poten-
64III, 19. 
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tia, sit bonum in potentia. Ens enim absolute dicitur, 
bonum autem etiam in ordine conaistit: non enim solum 
aliquid bonum dicitur quia est finis, vel quia est obti-
nens finem; s~d, etiam si nondum ad finem pervenerit, dum-
modo sit ordinatum in finem ex hoc ipso dicitur bonum. 
Materia ergo non potest simpliciter dici ens ex hoc quod 
est potentia ens, in quo importatur ordo ad esse: potest 
autem ex hoc simpliciter dici bona, propter ordinem ipsum. 
• •• Nam et ipsa non existentia, scilicet materia se-
cundum quod intelligitur privationi subiecta, appetit 
bonum, scilicet esse. Ex quo patet quod etiam sit bona: 
nihil enim appetit bonum nisi bonum. 55 
The goodness of God, then, reaches to the lowliest on the Thomisti 
ladder of being, to prime matter. 
A final consideration of the Thomistic theory of the partici-
pation of creatures in good is Aquinas' interpretation of the say-
. ing of Dionysius, "Bonum est diffusivum sui et ~."66 This dic-
tum has been translated thus: "Good tends to pour out itself and 
existence.,,67 Thomas says that, although the word to pour out 
generally indicates the operation of an efficient cause, it can 
still be taken in a broad sense to mean to influence, to make, and 
the like, and thus indicate the operation of any cause. In the 
saying, "Good tends to pour out itself and existence," Thomas 
have the diffusive quality of pouring out indicate the oper-
of a final cause, because a being is dependent upon ita fi-
1 cause in its whole existence whereas the efficient cause is 
t the measure of the thing but only its beginning and also the 
65C .G., III, 20. 
66De Ver., 21, 1, ad 4. 
67Truth, III, pp. 3-4. 
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effect shares or participates in the efficient cause only as in an 
assimilation of its form. 
[p]iffundere, licet secundum proprietatem vocabuli vide-
atur importare operationem causae efficientis, tamen 
largo modo potest importare habitudinem cujuscumque cau-
sae sicut influere et facere, et alia hujusmod1. Cum 
autem dicitur quod bonum est diffusivum secundum sui ra-
tionem, non est intelligenda ef1'usio secundum quod impor-
tat operationem causae efficientis, sed secundum quod 
importat habitudinem causae finalis; et talis diffusio n 
non est mediante aliqua virtute superaddita. 
Dicit autem bonum difi'usionem causae finalis, et 
non causae agentis: tum quia efficiens, in quantum hu-
jusmodi, non est rei mensura et perfectio, sed magis ini-
tiumj tum quia effectus participat causam efficientem 
secundum assimilationem formae tantumj sed finem conse-
quitur res secundum totum esse suum, et in hoc consiste-
bat ratio boni. 68 
Therefore, since the act of being of the creature is influenced in 
its constitution and operations by its ultimate end, which is the 
greatest good or the divine goodness, and the creature is ever 
imitating this goodness in the essential and accidental perfec-
tions of the creature, goodness is to be understood as pouring it-
self out according to the operations of final causality. 
Thus is it seen that all creatures in their entirety--matter, 
form, accidents, and existence--are dependent upon the divine 
goodness and participate in its perfections through its exemplary, 
efficient, and final causality. 
68 ~ Ver., 21, 1, ad 4. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
When something is said to be good, it is meant that the thing 
s something which is desireable not only to others but also to 
The gazelle roaming the jungles and plains of Africa of-
ers a great attraction to the appetite of the hungry lion, it is 
true; but the gazelle's own existence is a good to itself, so much 
so that it will make use of every means possible to take flight 
from the lion and preserve its own existence. 
The good thing, then, is that which creates a tendency toward 
itself in others and in itself. Thus the notion of good always 
conveys the idea of end. This concept of good and its concomitant 
concept of end is interchangeable with the concept of being inas-
much as every being has some reference to existence which in itse 
is desireable and consequently a good. 
But where does the good thing get that by which it can be 
called good? What is the source of the goodness of any being? St 
Thomas' fourth proof for the existence of God tells us that God, 
in Whom are all the perfections of creation in their greatest per-
fection, is the cause of all the goodness which is to be found in 
creatures. l 
There is something about the idea of good, however, which, 
IS.T., I, 2, 3 c, quarta via 
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sychologically speaking, makes it more attractive than any of the 
other divine perfegtions. A man is more interested in a thing if 
he knows that the thing is good than if he knows that it exists, 
or that it is one, or even true. The goodness of his home means 
re to him than its existence, oneness, or its truth. And the 
his house, like the goodness of any creature, is due 
Itimately to the goodness of God, the source of all goodness; for 
the ultimate reason why anything can be said to be good is that it 
participates in the goodness of God through the causality of God, 
hich constitutes the creature in goodness and preserves it in the 
same. 
This participation is always had through a likeness of the 
divine goodness. For every good thing is a model of the divine 
goodness, not an exact model because such would be the divine 
goodness and consequently there would be two supreme beings, which 
is impossible. But each being portrays some facet of the divine 
essence and its goodness is a likeness of some aspect of the di-
vine goodness. 
Of all the creatures on the face of the earth, man is the 
highest because he possesses the divine qualities of intellection 
and free choice. And man by the proper use of these qualities can 
most nearly imitate the goodness of God by commtmicating goodness 
to the lower creatures on earth. 
Thus there is a hierarchy of goods that extends from the low-
entity on the Thomistic scale of being--prime matter--up through 
and the and final to the hi est 
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which is the divine goodness itself; and all of these beings re-
ceive their goodness from God by imitating some aspect of His di-
vine essence. 
What deserves stress in this doctrine of participation of 
creatures in good is the active or dynamic side of the metaphysi-
cal reality. Participation of creatures in good should not be con-
ceived of as so many creatures holding on to SOme good thing, as 
forty children in a classroom holding on to lollipops received for 
good recitations. Participation in good should be thought of as a 
continual receiving of a stream of gifts from the author of all 
goodness. 
Not the least part of the dynamic side of participation in 
good is the attraction of all creatures to the goodness of God as 
to their last end. God is the gigantic loadstone attracting all 
beings to Himself, because every being that seeks another and 
tends to it as a good, does so because the real or supposed good 
appears as a likeness of some aspect of the divine gOOdness. This 
special attraction of man to God has been enshrined most beautiful-
ly in the language of man by St. Augustine, who says to God, ItFor 
Thou hast made us for Thyself and our hearts are restless until 
they rest in Thee. 1t2 
2 Confessiones, Liber Ij translated by F.J. Sheed, ~ Confes-
sions of Saint Augustine, (New York, 1942), p. 3. 
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